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Medical Product Information Incentives
and the Transparency Paradoxt
DANIEL R. CAHOY
[We] are faced with what may be the single greatest drug safety
catastrophe in the history of this country or the history of the world. We
are talking about a catastrophe that . should have been largely or
completely avoided.
-Dr. David J. Graham ofthe FDA'
Recent allegations that essential safety and efficacy information is often suppressed
by medical product manufacturers or poorly evaluated by regulators have led to calls
for greater information transparency. The public is justifiably concerned that its
ability to conduct an informed risk-benefit assessment of drugs and medical devices is
compromised. Several changes have already been made to federal regulatory law and
medical research policy to mandate greater disclosure and more changes are being
considered. However, it is possible that these measures may backfire by enhancing
significant tort-based economic disincentives for generating new information. In other
words, greater disclosure requirements could, paradoxically, lead to less information
production. The resulting shortfall could be extremely dangerous and have a
detrimental effect on health care for years to come. This Article addresses the crisis on
the horizon and proposes a unique solution that connects tort law disincentives to
information production incentives. It explains why an economically rational company
would be expected to respond to transparency with less information and proposes a
tort liability limitation as a solution that will encourage a cost-internalizing company
to increase information production. This Article also considers the impact of the
FDA's recent position on preemption along with other regulatory enhancements and
concludes that these are effective, but second-best solutions.
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INTRODUCTION
When results from clinical studies came to light in 2004 demonstrating that a
popular and widely prescribed class of pain-relieving drugs could pose significant
cardiac risks,2 the ensuing controversy grabbed the nation's attention.3 It served as the
tipping point for a wave of discontent that had been building for some time.4 Most
importantly, the discussion exacerbated fears that government regulatory agencies, like
the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), are not nearly potent enough
to effectively investigate, assess, and resolve the risk-benefit equation for various
products.5 Adding fuel to the fire was the concern that the regulated companies
themselves may be negligently or intentionally concealing the true dangers of these and
similar goods essential for basic health and quality of life.6 Since that time, it has
2. See Barbara Martinez, Vioxx Lawsuits May Focus on FDA Warning in 2001, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 5, 2004, at B1 (detailing Merck's abrupt decision to pull its pain reliever, Vioxx, from
the market after a placebo-controlled clinical trial affirmed information from earlier studies
indicating a higher risk of cardiac arrest).
3. Cf Gardiner Harris, Drug Safety System is Broken, A Top F.D.A. Official Says, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2005, at A24 ("'This system has obviously broken down to some extent, as far as
the fully informed provider and the fully informed patient."' (quoting Dr. Janet Woodcock, FDA
Deputy Commissioner of Operations)).
4. See, e.g., Allison Frankel, Still Ticking, AM. LAw., Mar. 2005, at 92 (providing a
detailed description of the trials and tribulations faced by Wyeth in attending to litigation
stemming from the 1997 discovery that its widely prescribed diet drug combination, fen-phen,
caused heart valve damage); Barry Meier, New Report Of Problems At Guidant, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 2005, at C1 (reporting on both the intense scrutiny surrounding medical device
manufacturer, Guidant, related to the finding that one of its pacemakers has a tendency to short
-circuit and the likelihood that the manufacturer was aware of the danger at least three years
before the product was recalled).
5. The concern regarding the FDA's abilities continues, as noted in a recent Wall Street
Journal editorial:
The notion that the FDA should "err on the side of safety" sounds like a tautology
but is an affront to patients with incurable or poorly treatable diseases.., we only
damage them further with paternalistic public policy that prevents individuals from
exercising their own judgment about risks and benefits.
Henry I. Miller, Paternalism Costs Lives, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2006, at A14.
6. See Alex Berenson, Despite Vow, Drug Makers Still Withhold Data, N.Y. TIMES, May
31, 2005, at Al (describing the criticism that Merck and Pfizer have faced for failing to disclose
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become even more evident that the risk-benefit analysis for medical products is
tremendously complex and may vary significantly depending on the individual. The
result has been an unprecedented demand for change in the regulatory, corporate, and
scientific environment surrounding the development and marketing of medical
products. There is a common theme in this movement: public information disclosure.
The modem health care system depends on providers and consumers having
sufficient information about safety and efficacy to make rational choices about
available treatments. Manufacturers play an essential role in generating and collecting
the information, which is then evaluated and disseminated through the regulatory
process. Problems occur when that process breaks down and essential information is
either not produced or effectively disclosed--creating information asymmetry.8 In the
context of recent events, a consensus has emerged that too much information of the
type most directly relevant to products already on the market-clinical studies (or
trials) of the drug or device-is locked away from the public. 9 Despite the established
forces pushing disclosure, manufacturers may have too much flexibility to keep
damaging information secret. Thus, the move toward greater disclosure in the conduct
of industry-sponsored clinical trials is de rigueur, and initiatives exist that would
operate on many levels to achieve this. If secrecy is the ill, transparency is the cure, so
the argument goes.
Unfortunately, it is possible that these well-intentioned efforts toward greater
disclosure may end up causing more harm than good. The one-sided nature of the
discussion ignores the significant impact of post-marketing information-creation
disincentives. In particular, the fact that the prospect of crippling tort liability hangs
precipitously over every piece of negative information brought to light related to the
safety or efficacy of a drug or medical device imposes an ex post transfer of costs on
manufacturers. Because greater transparency generally means greater tort exposure,
companies may make the logical choice to simply diminish the source of liability. In
other words, companies may reduce the amount of information they create (e.g., by
clinical trial results indicating the dangers of COX-2 painkillers, as well as a lack of consensus
in the industry on the appropriate amount of disclosure). As of this writing, Merck has
successfully defended nine lawsuits related to its handling of Vioxx information disclosure, and
lost five. See Heather Won Tesoriero, Jury Awards $47.5 Million to Man in Vioxx Retrial,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2007, at A3.
7. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 5, at A14. In one of the most striking representations of the
individual nature of medical products, an FDA advisory panel voted to permit Vioxx back on
the market due to its benefits for certain patients. See FDA, Summary Minutes, Joint Meeting
with the Arthritis Drug Advisory Committee (Feb. 18, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/
dockets/ac/05/ minutes/2005-4090M 1_Final.htm. However, the FDA declined to follow that
recommendation. See FDA, Public Health Advisory, FDA Announces Important Changes and
Additional Warnings for COX-2 Selective and Non-Selective Non-SteroidalAnti-Inflammatory
Drugs (NSAIDs) (Apr. 7, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/advisory/COX2.htm.
8. A severe information asymmetry that results in one party's inability to rationally
evaluate a transaction is considered a market failure. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW &
ECONOMics 47 (4th ed. 2004) ("[S]evere asymmetries can disrupt markets so much that a social
optimum cannot be achieved by voluntary exchange.") Markets operate most efficiently when
critical information is fully available to all parties. See, e.g., id.
9. See, e.g., Kay Dickersin & Drummond Rennie, Registering Clinical Trials, 290 JAMA
516, 516-17 (2003) (discussing the harm that results from clinical study information remaining
confidential).
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conducting fewer voluntary clinical trials). Measures meant to increase information
may actually result in less. This transparency paradox could produce a more dangerous
health care environment and eventually erode public confidence in the system.
Is there a way to resolve the transparency paradox by better balancing tort and
regulatory incentives? A large body of literature has considered the proper role of
regulation and tort law in medical product innovation or safety,10 but the issue of
private firm information incentives has not been prominently addressed. Recent
attempts by the FDA to attenuate tort liability through preemption address this problem
to some degree,'" but the impact may be less than could be achieved through a measure
more specifically directed to information production. This Article presents a unique
perspective on the problem and proposes that the key to resolving the crisis lies in
addressing both creation disincentives as well as disclosure incentives. By applying a
narrow variant of the familiar tort law limitation on evidence of subsequent remedial
measures, this Article suggests that incentives for information creation will be greatly
increased.
The Article begins in Part I by considering how private firms are encouraged to
produce information in the first place. It describes the ex ante and ex post economic
incentives that comprise the so-called dual-track system for generating information on
medical products. In Part II, the Article explains how modem "practice-based" tort
10. See, e.g., STEVEN GARBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE ECONOMICS OF
PHARMACEUTICALS AND MEDICAL DEVICES (1993); Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism
in the Market for Drugs: Lessons from Vioxx and Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. &
ETHICS 741 (2005); Marc T. Law, How do Regulators Regulate? Enforcement of the Pure Food
and Drugs Act, 1907-38, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 459 (2006); Richard L. Manning, Products
Liability and Prescription Drug Prices in Canada and the United States, 40 J.L. & ECON. 203
(1997); Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance,
Compensation, and the Role ofLitigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 587 (2005). A
major subset of Garber's work relates to the specific question of federal regulatory preemption
of state tort law. See, e.g., Robert R. Gasaway, The Problem of Federal Preemption:
Reformulating the Black Letter Rules, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 25 (2005); Michael D. Green, Statutory
Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461
(1996); James T. O'Reilly, A State of Extinction: Does Food and Drug Administration Approval
of a Prescription Drug Label Extinguish State Claims for Inadequate Warning?, 58 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 287 (2003); David G. Owen, Federal Preemption of Products Liability Claims, 55
S.C. L. REv. 411 (2003); Sasha B. Rieders, State Law Tort Claims and the FDA: Proposing a
Consumer-Oriented Prescription in MedicalDevice Cases, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 1159 (2004);
Teresa Moran Schwartz, Regulatory Standards and Products Liability: Striking the Right
Balance Between the Two, U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 431 (1997). An entire symposium was held at
Georgetown University on the regulatory compliance defense, producing several excellent
articles on this topic. See, e.g., Michael D. Green & William B. Schultz, Tort Law Deference to
FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 88 GEO. L.J. 2119 (2000); Lars Noah, Rewarding
Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147
(2000); Robert L. Rabin, Keynote Paper: Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J.
2049 (2000); Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort Liability: Limiting
the Dual-Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167 (2000); see also W. Kip Viscusi, Steven R. Rowland,
Howard L. Dorfman & Charles J. Walsh, Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An
Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV.
1437 (1994).
11. See infra Part III.B.1.
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disincentives arising from information disclosure can cause companies to produce less
than the optimal amount of information. It demonstrates how recent enhancements to
information disclosure incentives move the landscape closer to total transparency while
the corresponding increases in creation disincentives remain unaddressed, setting the
stage for a transparency paradox. The forgoing analysis leads to a proposal in Part III
to resolve the paradox by creating a market-based information production incentive
through limited tort reform. The second-best nature of an FDA preemption regime or
enhanced regulatory authority is also discussed. In view of the enormous social
benefits to increased information, the paper concludes that the production incentives
outlined herein must be considered if the public is to have the ability to conduct
anything approximating a rational evaluation of medical products.
I. INFORMATION INCENTIVES IN THE DUAL-TRACK MEDICAL PRODUCT
INFORMATION CREATION AND DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK
The decision to use or prescribe a drug or medical device is (or should be) a
complex assessment of risk and benefit. An individual's decision regarding the safety
profile of a particular product can be manipulated, though, by controlling the
information the individual receives. No drug or device is completely "safe." Even
regulatory agencies that approve the marketing of medical products plainly
acknowledge the existence of risk.12 But a patient or provider may determine that
significant benefits outweigh the potential for harm and nevertheless choose to use a
particular treatment.' 3 Thus, a rational risk-benefit analysis is an important part of
12. E.g., FDA, MANAGING THE RISKS FROM MEDICAL PRODUCT USE: CREATING A
MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, REPORT TO THE FDA COMMISSIONER FROM THE TASK FORCE ON RISK
MANAGEMENT 21 (1999) [hereinafter FDA RISK MANAGEMENT REPT.] ("Although medical
products are required to be safe, safety does not mean zero risk, since all medical products are
associated with risks."). See also Miller, supra note 5 (noting, as a former FDA official, that all
drugs have risks and there are dangers in reducing access to potentially harmful drugs if patients
that would obtain significant benefits cannot obtain them).
13. If the absence of risk was the sole criteria for permitting medical products to enter the
stream of commerce, almost nothing could be sold. Efficacy is really just a question of whether a
medical treatment will have the effect it is represented to have under specified conditions. See
21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(5) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (an application must demonstrate that a new
drug is backed by "substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or is
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
proposed labeling thereof'). Determining efficacy can be considerably more complex than
safety, as there are many degrees, and the impact may vary by patient type or specific disease
characteristics. See HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & JOHN M. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF
PHARMACEUTICALS: BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND RISKS 3 (1983) (discussing the efficacy
determination). Not surprisingly, the FDA has struggled to determine what evidence is
appropriate to demonstrate efficacy adequate to permit approval. See Steven R. Salbu, The FDA
and Public Access to New Drugs: Appropriate Levels of Scrutiny in the Wake of HIV AIDS, and
the Diet Drug Debacle, 79 B.U. L. REV. 93, 97-102 (1999) (discussing the difficulty in finding
the perfect balance and noting the historical risks of under-inclusion and over-inclusion); Jeffrey
E. Shuren, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response to Changing
Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291, 308-13 (2001) (reviewing the gradual development
of the FDA's assessment of efficacy in response to changing circumstances, including the AIDS
public health crisis).
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prescribing and using medical products, and it is utterly dependant on access to clear,
current, and relatively complete safety and efficacy information.
Although a number of entities generate information about medical products, the
company that manufactures or markets a product produces the lion's share. 14 Most
importantly, private companies carry out the essential clinical trials that directly
address the effect of a medical product in a live patient population. 15 For this reason,
the current system absolutely depends on the existence of incentives that will compel
companies to allocate their own resources to undertake medical product testing and
analysis. Functionally speaking, there must be incentives to induce information
creation as well as information disclosure. Both must be maximized to provide
information sufficient for rational end-user analysis.
How do we craft information incentives for private firms? As a general matter,
government and private sector creation and disclosure incentives are derived from two
separate legal policy tracks. One depends on creating prospective-or ex ante-
incentives to encourage the discovery of safety and efficacy issues before harm occurs.
Included in this track are regulatory rules as well as market-based forces. A second,
independent track creates retrospective-or ex post-incentives that punish companies
14. See Joe Collier & Ike Iheanacho, The Pharmaceutical Industry as an Informant, 360
LANCET 1405 (2002) ("Although the primary function of drug companies is to develop and
market drugs, these companies spend more time and resources generating, gathering, and
disseminating information."); Jennifer Couzin, Gaps in the Safety Net, SCIENCE, Jan. 14, 2005,
at 198, 196 ("FDA generally relies on companies to run postmarketing trials, called phase IV
studies, often requesting them as a condition for a drug's approval.").
15. No study is considered as critical or useful in realistically gauging performance as one
using human participants, also known as a clinical trial. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CURT D.
FURBERG & DAVID L. DEMETS, FUNDAMENTALS OF CLINICAL TRIALS 1 (3d ed. 1998) ("It is only
in the past few decades that the clinical trial has emerged as the preferred method in the
evaluation of medical interventions."). More specifically, the variant known as the randomized
clinical trial (also referred to as a randomized controlled trial (RCT)) is considered the "gold
standard" of medical research. See ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL
RESEARCH 211 (2d ed. 1986) ("[T]he RCT is the gold standard for evaluating therapeutic
efficacy.") (emphasis in original); Dickersin & Rennie, supra note 9, at 516; Steven M. Teutsch,
Marc L. Berger & Milton C. Weinstein, Comparative Effectiveness: Asking the Right Questions,
Choosing the Right Method, 24 HEALTH AFF. 128, 129 (2005) ("When assessing efficacy, RCTs
are considered to be the gold standard."). In the modem world of medical product review, any
conclusion regarding a medical product's safety or efficacy ultimately depends on what is found
in these small, controlled trials on humans. Of course, a number of pieces of information are
relevant to the risk-benefit analysis. For example, an elucidation of the chemical structure,
studies on stability, and descriptions of the physiochemical characteristics can tell a trained eye
much about how a drug will be likely to act in a human physiological setting. See, e.g., FDA,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: S7A SAFETY PHARMACOLOGY STUDIES FOR HUMAN PHARMACEUTICALS
2-3 (2001) (explaining the rationale for the non-clinical pharmacology studies in drug approval
applications). Similarly, the testing of certain medical devices in animals can be an accurate
predictor of the toxicity and absorption profile in human patients. FDA, FROM TEST TUBE TO
PATIENT: IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH HUMAN DRUGS 16 (1999) [hereinafter TEST TUBE] ("[I]n
animal testing, scientists measure how much of a drug is absorbed into the blood, how it is
broken down chemically in the body, the toxicity of its breakdown products (metabolites), and
how quickly the drug and its metabolites are excreted from the body.").
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for the harm resulting from the failure to discover or disseminate information. Such
incentives include tort-based product liability and consumer protection litigation.
Ideally, the two tracks are complementary. For example, an ex post litigation
incentive may fill in an ex ante regulatory gap to inspire a company to create or release
information that would otherwise be withheld from the public. However, there is also a
great potential for conflict. The independent nature of the incentive systems may result
in the formation of unintended information disincentives. This occurs most prominently
when the broad and uncontrolled nature of certain ex post liability resulting from
disclosure abuts the limited power of creation-inducing ex ante incentives. In many
cases, it is likely that the disincentives will be strong enough to reduce the production
of important medical product information. For efficient flow, the impact of the two
tracks on firm behavior must be assessed and balanced, particularly in crafting new
measures that may disturb the status quo.
A. The Limited Nature of Ex Ante Incentives
From a societal perspective, the need to uncover medical product safety and
efficacy information before harm results is obvious. It follows that there is an
inclination to transfer the societal desire for loss avoidance to firms in the form of ex
ante information production requirements. One is not at all surprised to find that a
manufacturer encounters the strongest ex ante information disclosure and creation
incentives through regulatory requirements for the sale of medical products. Powerful
incentives derived from the need for marketplace success additionally exist to solicit
voluntary information production. Together, these forces encourage the production of a
great deal of important information.
But the ex ante system is far from complete. There are limitations in these
incentives that necessarily leave significant information gaps. Thus, in view of their
bounded nature, one must consider ex ante incentives with an eye toward how
additional mechanisms can add to the risk-benefit picture.
1. Circumscribed Information Generation and Disclosure
Through the Regulatory Process
The FDA-the U.S. federal agency that has the power to control the interstate
marketing of medical products16-- induces a substantial amount of information
production, and its approval procedures are representative of the regulatory review
process at its most sophisticated level.17 The ex ante information incentive structure in
16. In the United States, the FDA possesses the authority to regulate, inter alia, the
marketing of drugs, § 355(a) ("No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into
interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to
subsection (b) or (j) of this section is effective with respect to such drug."), biologics, 42 U.S.C.
§ 262 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) ("No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into
interstate commerce any biological product unless ... a biologics license is in effect for the
biological product ...."), and medical devices, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360, 360e (2000 & Supp. IV
2004) (requiring approval for various classes of medical devices), including the decision
whether to allow a sale at all.
17. Regulatory agencies in many other countries also play an important role in information
production, and some-such as the European Union's European Medicines Agency (EMEA)
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place here is extraordinarily straightforward. Firms must produce sufficient information
to convince the FDA to approve the drug, biologic, or medical device as safe and
effective for marketing.18 If an applicant cannot convince the FDA that the data is
sufficient, the sunk research and development costs will never be recouped. 19
Moreover, expected future revenue streams for the marketing of the drug will not be
realized. Thus, it is to an applicant's advantage to make significant investments in
information production.
The agency's role begins when an applicant files an application to use the drug or
device in preliminary studies on humans. 20 This initial requirement is the jumping off
point for the essential clinical trials that will form the basis for assessing safety and
efficacy.21 Following the completion of clinical trials sufficient to satisfy the FDA's
approval standards, a company may choose to submit a formal application for approval
to market. 22 In reviewing the application, the FDA may base its analysis on the
and Japan's Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (MHLW)-possess a level of sophistication
that comports with the FDA's. See EMEA, EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY (June 2006),
http://www.emea.eu.int/pdfs/general/direct/organigramme/ENOrganigramme.pdf; Thomas M.
Moore & Siobhan A. Cullen, Impact of Global Pharmaceutical Regulations on US. Products
Liability Exposure, 66 DEF. COUNs. J. 101, 105 (1999). All contribute to the information profile
of a product with an international market. Although distinct information may be collected,
information that is significant in understanding a product's safety-efficacy profile is even more
likely to be shared between primary international regulatory agencies. See, e.g., FDA,
CONFIDENTIALITY ARRANGEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE EU (EC AND EMEA) AND THE U.S.
FDA/DHHS IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR MEDICINAL PRODUCTS FOR HUMAN USE,
http://www.fda.gov/oia/ arrangements0904.html. Since, on balance, the incentives provided by
the most prominent regulatory agencies are similar, a description of the FDA's basic system is
representative.
18. See approval requirements under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), covering
drugs, § 355(d)(5), the Public Health Services Act (PHSA), covering most biologics not covered
under the FDCA, 21 C.F.R. § 601.2 (2006), and the Medical Devices Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360(b)
(2000 & Supp. IV 2004). The FDA's approach is holistic, weighing the strength of a patient's
response to the treatment versus the risks. See Margaret Gilhooley, When Drugs are Safe for
Some but Not Others: The FDA Experience andAlternatives for Product Liability, 36 Hous. L.
REv. 927, 938-40 (1999) (explaining that some uses pose significantly more risks than others
and this must be taken into account in the review process). A very strong response may
outweigh minor safety risks, and vice versa.
19. See GARBER, supra note 10, at 41 (noting that the FDA affects economic outcomes
primarily through its authority to restrict marketing of products).
20. Cf Sharona Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials: Responsible Research or
Unethical Practice?, 33 CONN. L. REv. 449, 466-67 (2001) (describing the use of
investigational new drugs in clinical trials).
21. The application for approval to test a new drug or biologic compound is known as an
investigational new drug (IND) application. See § 355(i) (outlining the investigational drug
exception). INDs mark the start of a long research process. See Richard J. Findlay, Originator
Drug Development, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 227, 228 fig.1 (1999) (figure showing timeline of
drug development). Medical device premarketing studies require the filing of an investigational
device exemption (IDE) and follow a similar, if less rigidly defined, investigation scheme. See
21 C.F.R. § 812.1 (2006).
22. Manufacturers submit a new drug application (NDA) in the case of a drug or a biologic
license application (BLA) in the case of treatments with biotechnology origins like vaccines. See
§ 355(a); 21 C.F.R. § 314.2 (2006) (purpose of drug application process); 42 U.S.C. § 262
(2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 21 C.F.R. § 601.2 (2006) (applications for biologics and procedures
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submitted information or request additional evidence such as new clinical trials to
confirm the safety and efficacy profile of the treatment.
23
Strict regulatory standards ensure that a wealth of information results from the pre-
approval process, and this stage in product development stands as the key ex ante
information generation point. However, information disclosure is at a minimum. This is
so because, to a great extent, the process surrounding regulatory applications and
approvals is confidential and the information disclosure requirements are limited.
Applicants do not have to publicly disclose that a preliminary study application has
been filed, nor must they disclose to anyone but the FDA (and local institutional review
boards) that one has been withdrawn. 4 Although applicants have the obligation to file
periodic reports containing summary information on premarketing studies with the
FDA,25 the final details of the studies may be completely protected from disclosure
under certain conditions such as application withdrawal. 26 Additionally, the submission
of the approval application is itself confidential, as is the detailed review by the FDA.27
Such restrictions provide a company with a great deal of control over information
related to a new product, at least until marketing approval.
Perhaps more surprising, details of the studies and other data underlying an
application may not be available even after it is approved. Although the approval
package is nominally public-the FDA is authorized to release the submitted
for filing). In the context of medical devices, applicants submit either a premarket approval
application (PMA) for particularly risky products, see 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2000 & Supp. IV
2004) (outlining premarket approval requirements); 21 C.F.R. § 814.1 (2006) (outlining
requirement of having an approved premarket approval application)), or a premarket
notification, see § 360(k); 21 C.F.R. § 807.81 (2006).
23. See, e.g., TEST TUBE, supra note 15, at 34 ("IfCDER's [Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research] evaluation of studies reveals major deficiencies, substantially more work by the
sponsor may be needed, ranging from further analyses to the conduct of new studies .... ").
24. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.130 (2006) ("The existence of an investigational new drug
application will not be disclosed by FDA unless it has previously been publicly disclosed or
acknowledged."); 21 C.F.R. § 812.38 (2006) ("FDA will not disclose the existence of an IDE
unless its existence has previously been publicly disclosed or acknowledged .. ").
25. 21 C.F.R. § 312.33 (2006) (requiring IND annual reports); 21 C.F.R. § 812.150 (2006)
(requiring IDE reports).
26. However, if an IND is withdrawn for safety reasons, the FDA and other parties
associated with the clinical trials (e.g., investigators and institutional review boards) must be
informed with the reason for withdrawal. 21 C.F.R. § 312.38 (2006). Additionally, IND
sponsors must report adverse events within fifteen days after learning of them during a series of
IND clinical trials. 21 C.F.R. § 312.32 (2006). Studies that relate to indications other than those
sought in an NDA may be deemphasized if they are primarily related to efficacy as opposed to
safety, and such studies must be reported, 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (d)(5) (2006). However, the FDA
states that they are primarily used to assess safety and suggests that they may be separated from
the primary safety and efficacy studies in the application documentation. See FDA, GUIDELINE
FOR THE FORMAT AND CONTENT OF THE CLINICAL AND STATISTICAL SECTIONS OF NEW DRUG
APPLICATIONS 25-26 (1988) (CDER guidance on NDA formats).
27. 21 C.F.R. § 314.430(b) (2006) ("FDA will not publicly disclose the existence of an
application or abbreviated application before an approvable letter is sent to the applicant....");
21 C.F.R. § 601.51 (b) (2006) ("The existence of a biological product file will not be disclosed
by the Food and Drug Administration before a biologics license application has been approved.
.. ."); 21 C F.R. § 814.9 (2006) ("Confidentiality of data and information in a premarket
approval application (PMA) file.").
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information via a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request 28 absent "extraordinary
circumstances"-FDA regulations make establishing extraordinary circumstances quite
easy, and even routine. 29 An applicant may claim a number of reasons for requesting
secrecy, including that many documents contain trade secrets or even that the data
could be used by a competitor to seek approval marketing overseas. 30 Without an
affirmative act on the applicant's part, this information may not be released into the
public domain.
The shroud of secrecy surrounding preliminary drug studies exists ostensibly to
protect trade secret and other proprietary business strategy information. 31 It is also
probably recognition of the fact that information resulting from the studies can be quite
preliminary and lead to misleading conclusions regarding treatment. 32 In practice, the
secrecy gives applicants an initial opportunity to conduct substantial testing outside of
the public eye.
In view of the disclosure limitations, it is clear that the FDA's preapproval rules are
imperfect as an information production mechanism, but they are even more lacking in
the postmarketing phase where the approval incentive is eliminated.33 This is a critical
information production point, because many of the most important safety and efficacy
problems only become clear after a drug has entered the patient population.34 Clinical
28. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000 & Supp. 1V 2004); 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (public disclosure of safety and effectiveness data); Pub.
Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA., 185 F.3d 898, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (affirming the
FDA's power to withhold IND studies based on Exemption 4 of FOIA). The FDA's official
policy is to make the "fullest possible disclosure of records to the public" consistent with its
other goals and obligations. 21 C.F.R. § 20.20 (2006).
29. See DONALD 0. BEERS, GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA APPROVAL
REQUIREMENTS § 5.01 (1999) ("In fact, for almost every application, FDA has been willing to
find 'extraordinary circumstances' for refusal to release such data .. .
30. Id.
31. 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.61, 314.430, 601.51 (2006). In fact, forced disclosure of trade secret
information in order to obtain agency approval could be considered a taking. See Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04 (1984) (disclosure of trade secrets submitted in
compliance with Environmental Protection Agency regulations could constitute a taking).
32. Analogously, the FDA places some restraints on the ability of the manufacturers to
advertise and otherwise disclose information during the approval process. See George W. Evans
& Arnold I. Friede, The Food and Drug Administration s Regulation of Prescription Drug
Manufacturer Speech: A First Amendment Analysis, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 365,401-03 (2003).
33. See, e.g., Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration's Use of
Postmarketing (Phase IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
295, 343-61 (2006) (providing'a very detailed review of the FDA's authority to require or
request postapproval studies and concluding that it must be based on strained statutory
interpretation that is ultimately "dubious"); Struve, supra note 10, at 600-01 (stating that there
are reasons to question the agency's effectiveness in monitoring postmarketing safety and
describing internal FDA survey results that reflect this sentiment).
34. Steenburg, supra note 33, at 375 ("Vioxx also highlights the reality that FDA is in a
weaker position to press for Phase IV studies once a drug is on the market-a time when the
need for such investigations can come into sharper focus."). A survey of the origins of 206
"black box" warnings, the FDA's most extreme caution, found that only twenty-nine percent
were the result of premarketing clinical trials. See, e.g., Judith E. Beach, Gerald A. Faich, F.
Gail Bormel & Frank J. Sasinowski, Black Box Warnings in Prescription Drug Labeling:
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studies that occur after FDA approval are known as phase IV, or postmarketing
studies.35 Such studies are generally not required for most drugs and devices.36 If an
issue arises that is deemed too minor to preclude approval, the FDA will often seek
agreement with an applicant to conduct postmarketing studies.37 An applicant need not
agree, but there may be a risk to objecting when approval has not been granted.38 Even
so, the FDA has very little authority to enforce the agreement.
39
Results of a Survey of 206 Drugs, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 403, 408 (1998).
35. See LEVINE, supra note 15, at 6-7; Richard J. Findlay, Originator Drug Development,
54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 227,227 (1999) ("After FDA approval, postmarketing testing continues
in Phase IV for, inter alia, side effects, clinical education, and possible new indications.").
36. But see 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2000); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.510, 601.41 (2004) (postmarketing
studies may be required for fast-track approval applications); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.55, 601.27
(2004) (postmarketing studies may be required for deferred pediatric approval).
37. See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, REPORTS ON THE STATUS OF POSTMARKETING
STUDIES-IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 130 OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997 4 (2006) [hereinafter FDAMA 130 GUIDANCE] ("A postmarketing
study might be conducted because you and FDA agree, in writing, that one or more such study
should be conducted.") (emphasis in original). Annual reports of these, as well as required
studies, must be submitted to the FDA. 21 U.S.C. § 356b (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 21 C.F.R. §
314.81 (b)(2)(vii) (2004).
38. Applicants are generally willing to make such concessions to ensure favorable treatment
in the approval process. Steenburg, supra note 33, at 334-37 ("[C]ompanies may 'agree' to
postmarketing commitments as a means to push drugs through the pipeline .... "). In fact, a
recent report estimated that seventy-three percent of new molecular entity drug approvals from
1998-2003 issue with postmarketing study commitments. Tufts Center for the Study of Drug
Development, FDA Requested Postmarketing Studies in 73% of Recent New Drug Approvals,
IMPACT REP., July-Aug. 2004, at 2.
39. The applicable statutes do not provide the FDA with the explicit power to enforce
voluntary agreements to conduct studies. Theoretically, the FDA could determine that such a
study was a record or report "necessary in order to enable the Secretary to determine, or
facilitate a determination, whether there is or may be ground for [revoking an approval under]
subsection (e) of this section." 21 U.S.C. § 355(k) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); see Steenburg,
supra note 33, at 343 (noting that the FDA relies on this interpretation for authority). In that
case, a failure to conduct the study could be grounds for the FDA to begin revocation
proceedings (which are by no means instantaneous). See § 355(e). The FDA has claimed such
power in a 2002 report to Congress. See FDA, REPORT TO CONGRESS, REPORTS ON
POSTMARKETING STUDIES [hereinafter FDAMA 130] (2002), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/fdama/pstmrktfdamal30.pdf (stating that in addition to authority to
mandate deferred pediatric studies and accelerated approval studies, "FDA has authority to order
an applicant to conduct a study if the information is necessary in order to facilitate a
determination whether grounds exist for revocation of approval (21 U.S.C. § 355(k))"). It is also
reflected in the relevant sections of the Code of Federal Regulations. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.530,
601.43 (2004). However, this appears to be a rather strained reading of the statute, as it actually
refers to the reporting of studies conducted, not the failure to conduct a study. § 355(k). Rather,
the FDA's primary power seems to be a statutory right to publicly embarrass a company that
does not comply:
If a sponsor fails to complete an agreed upon study required by this section by its
original or otherwise negotiated deadline, the Secretary shall publish a statement
on the Internet site of the Food and Drug Administration stating that the study was
not completed and, if the reasons for such failure to complete the study were not
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The FDA's ability to continue its evaluation after a product is on the market is
significantly restrained by the content of the approval negotiation. The agency cannot
require drug companies to conduct new trials once a drug is on the market.4 ° Other
information is gathered, but it may not be as useful in making medical treatment
decisions. 41 Information gaps must be filled, if at all, through the voluntary actions of
private companies. 42 Additional incentives must exist to induce such behavior.
43
satisfactory to the Secretary, a statement that such reasons were not satisfactory to
the Secretary.
21 U.S.C. § 356b(d) (2000).
40. FDA Calls for Warning Label Authority, Others Seek More Trials, National Registry,
33 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 278 (Mar. 14, 2005) (citing the FDA's Deputy
Director of the Office of New Drugs, Sandra Kweder) ("The FDA also does not have the
authority to require drug companies to conduct new clinical trials after a drug is on the
market."). There is, arguably, some ambiguity on this point. See Steenburg, supra note 33, at
345-47 (recounting several conflicting statements from government officials and legislators
regarding the FDA's postmarketing authority); INsTrruTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMIEs, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE
PUBLIC 155-56 (2007) [hereinafter loM REPORT] ("FDA's statutory authority to require
postmarketing studies has been a subject of debate for decades.").
41. For example, there are adverse event reports that describe a single patient's medical
problem encountered while using the drug. See § 355(k); 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.305, 314.80 (2004)
(drugs and biologics); see also 21 U.S.C. § 3601(2000) & 21 C.F.R. § 814.82 (2004) (medical
devices). The FDA uses the reports to spot potential problems, and may even issue alerts to the
public based on the information. Additionally, a manufacturer may make emergency changes to
a label prior to FDA review in response to adverse incidents. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(2)(i) (2005).
The reports themselves are fully available to the public, and easily viewed at the FDA's
MedWatch website (which also provides the portal for reporting incidents). See MedWatch: The
FDA Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting Program, http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/
index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2007). As accessible as these data are, they often provide a
significantly more ambiguous overview of safety than a large clinical trial. Given the
uncontrolled nature of adverse incident reports, it can be difficult to make a causal link to the
treatment or device in question. Moreover, reporting adverse incidents is mandatory only for
manufacturers (over whom the FDA has regulatory authority). 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80, 600.80,
803.50 (2004). Participation by physicians and patients, the parties who surely have the most
information on adverse consequences, is entirely voluntary. FDA, MedWatch-How to Report
Serious Adverse Events, http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/how.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2007)
(categorizing physician and consumer reporting as voluntary, but manufacturer, distributor,
packer, and medical device user facility reporting as mandatory). Therefore, the picture provided
by MedWatch is incomplete as well as imprecise.
42. A firm is permitted to conduct postmarketing studies by its own volition. The results of
these phase IV studies must also be reported to the FDA in the case of drugs, but not in the case
of biologics and medical devices. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.81 (b)(2)(viii) (2004) (requiring that an
annual report for approved application include the status of postmarketing studies other than
required and agreed upon); FDAMA 130 GUIDANCE, supra note 37, at 6 ("Under existing rules,
you, as an applicant for a biological product marketed under a biologics license application
(BLA) ... are not generally required to submit annual reports on the status of postmarketing
studies."). The FDA apparently does not require medical device reports and records other than
those pertaining to postmarketing surveillance. See 21 C.F.R. § 822.38 (2004).
43. There are, of course, practical limits to regulatory information creation. A medical
product could undergo an infinite number of test and clinical studies, and risks would still
remain. See Mary K. Olson, Pharmaceutical Policy Change and the Safety of New Drugs, 45
[Vol. 82:623
MEDICAL PRODUCT INFORMATION INCENTIVES
2. Market Incentives Encourage Information Production and
Disclosure to Increase Sales and Firm Profile
The power of the marketplace can provide a serious counterweight to the disclosure
limitations of regulatory incentives. Although the drug and medical device industry
may be permitted to keep information secret in a number of cases, the economic
benefits of early, limited disclosure can often outweigh the harm from a partial loss of
confidentiality. For example, large pharmaceutical companies in particular are
consumed by the need to demonstrate a future pipeline of new drugs as a measure of
overall corporate health.44 Smaller biotech or medical device companies may also feel
pressure to establish that products in development are still moving through the FDA
approval process.45 One of the best ways of establishing the viability of promising new
research is to disclose the existence of current preapproval studies.4 6 Postmarketing
studies may also be disclosed to create interest in new indications for an existing
product.47 And there may be considerable value in using clinical study information as a
signal to other companies of a desire to move into a particular treatment area.
Companies may disclose clinical information directly through a variety of means
including: websites, annual reports, or letters to physicians. Several independent news
organizations also collect this information and make it available to the public. 4s Of
J.L. & EcON. 615, 618 (2002) ("Even though firms spend many years and invest millions of
dollars to gather this evidence, it is impossible to resolve all uncertainty about drug safety (or
effectiveness) at the time of FDA approval."). Additionally, even if one could spend years
conducting every form of clinical trial imaginable, many problems would not appear until the
treatment reached a larger patient population. John P.A. loannidis, Contradicted and Initially
Stronger Effects in Highly Cited Clinical Research, 294 JAMA 218,220 (2005) (finding that, of
forty-five highly cited clinical trials that showed a benefit for clinical intervention, fourteen
(thirty-two percent) were either contradicted by, or found to show stronger effects than,
subsequent studies).
44. See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger, Long & Short: What Ails the Drug Industry? Go Ask Wall
Street and Its Short-Term Vision, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2004, at CI (considering the future
pipelines of several pharmaceutical companies and the impropriety of focusing on short-term
financial goals); John Simons, Lilly Goes offProzac, FORTUNE, June 28,2004, at 179 ("Lilly is
a bright spot in Big Pharma, widely acknowledged to have the industry's most bountiful
pipeline of new products.").
45. See Donna Marie DeCarolis & David L. Deeds, The Impact of Stocks and Flows of
Organizational Knowledge on Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation of the
Biotechnology Industry, 20 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 953, 964-65 (1999) (analyzing information
that indicates the success of a biotechnology company, and concluding that reports of product
pipelines are positively correlated).
46. In general, late-stage "phase III studies" are used because a company can be more
confident that the treatment at issue will actually make it to market. On the other hand, the
Imclone debacle certainly highlights the risks of over-confidence. See David Denby, The Life of
the Party, FORTUNE, Jan. 26, 2004, at 99 (detailing the downfall of former Imclone CEO, Sam
Waksal, for insider trading related to the cancer drug, Erbitux, which was thought to be days
away from FDA approval in 2003).
47. See Howard L. Dorfman & Linda Pissott Reig, Avoiding Legal and Ethical Pitfalls of
Industry-Sponsored Research: The Co-Existence of Research, Scholarship, and Marketing in
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 595, 602, 612-13 (2004).
48. For example, the Wall Street Journal has an online column titled "Checkup" that breaks
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course, the extent to which this may result in the selective disclosure of favorable
information is an issue of concern for both the regulatory49 and financial 5
communities. Further, the results of voluntarily disclosed studies are usually briefly
summarized at best and one cannot realistically conduct an independent evaluation of
the information.
Additionally, approval by the private scientific community can induce the voluntary
disclosure of information that could otherwise be held in confidence under FDA
regulations. In order to support a claim of efficacy, particularly in comparison to other
available treatments, great weight is placed on the conclusions of the private sector
(generally academic) medical establishment.51 The endorsement of researchers in the
field can create a very strong economic incentive by dramatically increasing a
product's sales and use. The most prominent journals have a tremendous impact and
may individually build or destroy a product's market. 52 Companies may even seek to
engage in research beyond the requirements of FDA approval if it may lead to such
broad acceptance. At the very least, there may be an incentive to disclose studies
conducted as part of the application process. This marketplace disclosure outlet is
certainly far from perfect, 53 but the increase in overall information production is likely
significant.
down new drugs by condition and describes the clinical testing phase. See
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,checkup,00.html (subscription required for access).
49. See Dorfman & Reig, supra note 47, at 612-14.
50. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in particular, is concerned with
companies misleading investors by manipulating studies related to FDA approval proceedings.
The SEC has taken action against companies that present an incomplete picture of the available
data. See British Biotech PLC, Admin. Proc. No. 3-9915, (Jun. 10, 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/ litigation/admin/34-41505.htm (instituting a 21C cease-and-desist
proceeding against a biotechnology company that suggested favorable clinical trial results based
on a measure disputed by the FDA).
51. Richard A. Rettig, The Industrialization of Clinical Research, 19 HEALTH AFF. 129, 141
(2000) (describing the dominance of academic health centers (AHC), but stating that they may
be in decline). According to former New England Journal of Medicine editor, Marcia Angell,
the percentage of studies conducted in academia may have already fallen below sixty percent.
See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: How THEY DECEIVE US AND
WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 101 (2004).
52. See Collier & Iheanacho, supra note 14, at 1405 ("Drug companies recognise the
enormous value of publishing clinical trial reports about their products in medical journals,
especially when the journal is prestigious.").
53. Critics have noted that published medical research can suffer from several institutional
biases. For example, a detailed literature review conducted by the American Medical
Association (AMA) found support for the notion that "[situdies with positive findings are more
likely to be published than studies with negative or null results.... See AMA, CSA REPORT,
INFLUENCE OF FUNDING SOURCE ON OUTCOME, VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF PHARMACEUTICAL
RESEARCH (June 2004), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/14314.html.
Additionally, reviewers may be at least subconsciously biased against studies that contradict
their own work, leading to a kind of inertia in clinical study publication. See Tom Reynolds,
Researchers Push for Publication, Registration ofAll Clinical Trials, 95 J. NAT'L CANCER INST.
772 (2003) (studies indicate that many negative studies are never reported or even submitted for
publication).
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B. Ex Post Liability Creates Supplemental Incentives
Legal liability for wrongful behavior is one of the most important incentives for the
creation and disclosure of information. While violating regulatory rules and industry
norms can have economic consequences, it pales in comparison to the potential losses
that may result from a single tort case involving punitive damages. 54 In addition, the
courts provide a means for redressing a broader set of harms than encompassed by the
mission of government regulatory agencies.55 In the context of medical products
companies, it is the desire to internalize the costs of future legal liability that promotes
information creation and disclosure.
1. Tort Law as a Powerful Pro-Disclosure Incentive
To the extent that information disclosure impacts the safe use of a product, tort law
acts as a supplemental means of punishing those whose secrecy creates unreasonable
risks. Unlike regulation-based incentives, which encourage prophylactic behavior to
identify and address safety and efficacy issues before injury, tort law is an ex post
hammer that falls if the detrimental effects of undesirable behavior occur. From an
economic perspective, it is expected that an appreciation of potential liability will
create incentives to engage in early loss-avoidance behavior to internalize the costs of
future harm. 56 This is the key to the second part of the "dual track" system of safety
incentives.57
54. Perhaps one of the most dramatic examples is a one-billion dollar verdict against
American Home Products (now Wyeth) in a case involving the diet drug, fen-phen. Eric
Seggebruch, United States-Strategies and Tactics: Electronic Data in Litigation, (July 30,
2004), http://194.88.95.39/iarticle.asp?articleid=27545 (registration required for access). The
size of the verdict may have been related to the discovery of an unusually damaging e-mail
message by administrator Kay Anderson which was culled from Wyeth's computer back-up
tapes: "Do I have to look forward to spending my waning years writing checks to fat people
worried about a silly lung problem... ?" Id. The one-billion dollar verdict was later reduced.
Note that the costs of liability could to some degree be passed on to consumers, resulting in
higher overall prices. This may partially explain differences between U.S. drug prices and those
of similarly situated countries like Canada. See Manning, supra note 10, at 233-34.
55. See Rabin, supra note 10, at 2071-73 (referring to the compensation gap that would
exist if tort law were to be completely supplanted by regulatory agency review). But see Stewart,
supra note 10, at 2181-85 (arguing that compensation shortfalls only arise in the rare, strict-
liability treatment of complex products liability, and the current system ends up perpetuating
inequities based on disparate jurisdictional treatments).
56. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 8, at 309-10 ("The economic essence of tort law
is its use of liability to internalize externalities created by high transactions costs."); RICHARD
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 197-98 (5th ed. 1998).
57. See, e.g., 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY 87-89 (1991) [hereinafter, ALl REPORTERS' STUDY] (describing tort law and
regulation as a dual system of remedies); Stewart, supra note 10, at 2169-70 (essay by former
Chief Reporter on the American Law Institute (ALl) study describing the impact of the dual-
track system, which can be positive or negative depending on the circumstances of the
regulatory environment). Some refer to it as "regulation through litigation." See, e.g., Victor E.
Swartz & Leah Lorber, State Farm v. Avery: State Court Regulation Through Litigation Has
Gone Too Far, 33 CONN. L. REv. 1215, 1237 (2001).
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In a highly regulated state prior to the marketing of a product, as in the preapproval
stage of a drug or medical device, tort incentives may add little over regulatory and
market incentives.5" However, as detailed above, following the approval of a product,
the incentives for mandatory information production dwindle. 59 At this point, a firm
must see economic benefits to voluntarily producing information or such investments
may not be made. When a company, through whatever means, discovers negative
information, tort law can provide a powerful incentive to the extent the law places
liability on a company that does not responsibly disclose the information to the
appropriate regulators and in some instances the public. 60 Additionally, costs are
reduced when such information is discovered early, before a greater number of people
can be affected or the individual harm increases. 61 A rational firm would be expected
to invest in uncovering and releasing potentially damaging information in order to
minimize these costs.
Ultimately, the strength of the tort incentive is linked to the acts for which a
company may find itself liable. In the context of most high-risk products, the most
concerning act is usually the marketing of a defectively designed product.62 Although
drugs, biologics, and medical devices present the type of significant safety issues that
would seem appropriate for design-defect cases, the viability of this cause of action has
been significantly curtailed in most states. The rationale is overriding public policy:
Most courts and commentators acknowledge the fact that it is extremely difficult-if
not impossible-to produce a medical product that does not pose some risk of injury
for at least part of the population, and valuable treatments might disappear if liability
were automatic.63 This notion has become famously enshrined in the widely adopted
comment k to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which precludes
58. This is due to the comprehensive nature of mandatory information creation and
disclosure as well as to the negligible tort liability that exists when most people are not at risk
because a product is not on the market.
59. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
60. See Rabin, supra note 10, at 2068-69.
61. Medical products often require several years beyond approval to achieve peak sales. See
Henry Grabowski, John Vernon & Joseph A. DiMasi, Returns on Research and Development
for 1990s New Drug Introductions, PHARMACOECONOMICS, Supplement 3, 2002, at 11.
Therefore, early investigations have a real chance of averting widespread harm. In many
respects, the notion of early attention is the theory behind "medical monitoring" liability, which
seeks to impose on a manufacturer the costs of monitoring persons who might fall ill due to their
use of that manufacturer's product. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Risks of and Reactions to
Underdeterrence in Torts, 70 Mo. L. REv. 691, 719-20 (2005).
62. Design-defect liability seeks to hold manufacturers responsible for the marketing of
unreasonably dangerous products, regardless of fault. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A(2)(a) (1963) ("The rule.., applies although... the seller has exercised all possible care
in the preparation and sale of his product. .. ."). The most common test asks whether a safer
design was a reasonable alternative, considering the state of the art and market conditions,
among other things. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 698-700
(5th ed. 1984).
63. See PRODUCTS LiABILirY: PHARMACEUTICAL DRUG CASES §4.02 (Donald E. Vinson &
Alexander H. Slaughter eds., 1988) [hereinafter PRODUCTS LiABLTY]; see also M. Stuart
Madden, The Enduring Paradox of Products Liability Law Relating to Prescription
Pharmaceuticals, 21 PACE L. REv. 313, 321 (2001); Richard McCormick, Pharmaceutical
Manufacturer's Duty to Warn ofAdverse DrugReactions, 66 DEF. COuNs. J. 59,61-62 (1999).
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strict liability for "unavoidably unsafe" products, so long as adequate warnings are
provided. 6
One recurrent theme in the unavoidably unsafe doctrine regarding drug and device
strict product liability is the requirement for accurate information concerning safety
and efficacy. Whether one considers a drug company's determination of safer
alternatives or a physician's decision to prescribe to certain patients, a complete
knowledge is presumed and the discovery of concealed information can defeat the
standard defenses. 65 This necessarily directs the design defect inquiry to information
disclosure, which is generally the scope of a failure-to-warn cause of action.66 For that
reason, it makes sense that failure-to-warn cases make up the bulk of medical products
liability litigation.67
Liability issues in failure-to-warn cases arise in the context of consumer injuries that
could have been avoided if the proper information regarding the risks of use was
disclosed.6 8 The failure to warn could theoretically fall within any one of three possible
tort causes of action: (1) a warning defect, implicating strict liability;69 (2) a negligent
act on the part of the manufacturer; 70 or (3) an intentional act. 7 Because an intentional
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A cmt. k (1963). Comment k must be read in
conjunction with commentj to understand the association between unavoidably unsafe products
and warnings. Id. at cmt. k,j. This presumption of drug and device safety is taken even one step
further by the most recent ALl articulation of the law, section 6 of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts, which insulates a manufacturer from liability if a "reasonable healthcare provider" would
prescribe the treatment or device for any class of patients. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) (1997). Section 6 was specifically drafted to address medical
products and to bring uniformity to the somewhat disparate treatment of comment k. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Wagner & Laura L. Peterson, The New Restatement (Third) of Torts-Shelter from
the Product Liability Storm for Pharmaceutical Companies and Medical Device
Manufacturers?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225,228 (1998) ("The Restatement (Third) was drafted
with the hope of finally defining the law and setting forth specific rules addressing the unique
characteristics of prescription drugs and medical devices."); George W. Conk, Is There a Design
Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1105-07
(2000) (criticizing the ALI for essentially adopting a super-negligence standard). This is
generally perceived to be a strong move to restrict liability for design defects in most cases. But
see William A. Dreier, Manufacturers' Liability for Drugs and Medical Devices Under the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 30 SEToN HALL L. REv. 258,259-260 (1999)
(arguing that a consideration of the entirety of section 6 suggests that manufacturers have not, in
fact, been given such broad license to ignore product liability when producing products).
65. See Dreier, supra note 64, at 264.
66. Arguably, this is as it should be, a notion supported in the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
Id. ("In a highly regulated industry in which the FDA acts as gatekeeper, the section breaks with
the traditional tests for liability to focus on the real issues raised by most cases: adequate
warnings.").
67. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision ofSection 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512, 1542 (1992) ("It is not at all
difficult to summarize the standards courts have used in deciding prescription drug cases. The
overwhelming majority of drug cases have been based on failure to warn.").
68. See PRODUCTS LIABILrY, supra note 63, at § 4.23 (noting that some courts refuse to
find liability if the failure to warn was not the cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury).
69. See id. at § 4.09; McCormick, supra note 63, at 61-62.
70. See PRODUCTS LIABILrrY, supra note 63, at § 4.08; McCormick, supra note 63, at 61-
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failure to warn requires proof akin to common law fraud or false advertising, 72 it may
be more difficult to prevail under this theory.73 However, negligent and strict liability
failure-to-warn cases are common when a manufacturer is found to possess undisclosed
information impacting the safety or efficacy profile of a medical product.74 To prove a
strict liability failure, a plaintiff must show that a manufacturer was, or should have
been, aware of a product's dangerous propensities and that an insufficient disclosure
was made.75 A negligence case of this type is very similar. Many courts draw no
distinction between strict liability and negligence in design defect cases.76
Significantly, tort incentives that arise from failure to warn cases generally compel
information disclosure but not creation. As a general matter, tort law places a
requirement on manufacturers to disclose pertinent information that they already
possess.77 It may also mandate the creation of new information if done as part of
routine product research and development or in response to a clear indication of a
problem. 78 Expensive and speculative information creation efforts, such as the
71. JAMES M. BECK & ANTHONY VALE, DRUG AND MEDICAL DEVICE PRODUCT LIABILITY
DESKBOOK § 2.13 (2d release 2005). However, it has been noted that intentional failures are
frequently pled when it is clear that a manufacturer has engaged in a risk-benefit analysis in
marketing a product. See Malcolm E. Wheeler, A Proposal for Further Common Law
Development of the Use of Punitive Damages in Modern Product Liability Litigation, 40 ALA.
L. REV. 919, 922-24 (1989) ("Modem substantive tort law principles tend to make punitive
damages arguments of that nature available in every design-defect and inadequate-warning
case.").
72. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,528-30 (1992) (commenting on the
alleged conspiracy by cigarette manufacturers to conceal the dangers of smoking).
73. BECK & VALE, supra note 71, at § 2.13 ("While fraud/intentional misrepresentation
claims against manufacturers of prescription medical products are allowed if properly pleaded,
claims of this nature have by and large met with only limited success.").
74. See infra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
75. See Bernard J. Garbutt III & Melinda E. Hofmann, Recent Developments in
Pharmaceutical Products Liability Law: Failure to Warn, the Learned Intermediary Defense,
and Other Issues in the New Millennium, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 269, 269-72 (2003) (restating
the general elements of a pharmaceutical failure-to-wam case).
76. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 63, at § 4.12 ("[T]he distinction between these two
theories is more semantic than real in a drug products liability case."); Henderson & Twerski,
supra note 67, at 1530-32 (arguing that since the risk-benefit test and foreseeability issues are
generally applied to strict product liability for failure to warn, there is little reason to distinguish
the two); McCormick, supra note 63, at 63 (citing cases holding that negligence and strict
liability failure to warn are indistinguishable). One difference may be a slightly higher standard
for assessing what knowledge a reasonably prudent manufacturer possesses and the acts it would
take to fulfill one's duties in a negligence case, but it depends on the court. See id. at 63-65
(detailing cases wherein courts have attempted to determine how standards for negligent and
strict liability failure to warn differ, particularly in the case of pharmaceuticals).
77. See BECK & VALE, supra note 71, at § 2.04[ 1] (citing cases and concluding that courts
generally require a manufacturer to warn about risks of which it has actual or constructive
knowledge).
78. See id. at § 3.07. For example, courts have found manufacturers liable under a tort
theory based on the failure to adequately test the product. See, e.g., Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (manufacturer failed to discover dangers
associated with the drug and warn physicians), modified, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969). But the
duty to test is that which arises from the normal course of pharmaceutical research and
development. Therefore, a products liability case premised on a failure to test can be viewed as a
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postapproval initiation of large-scale clinical trials, simply to identify unknown safety
issues, should not generally be considered to fall within one's loss-avoidance duties.79
In other words, companies will usually not face liability for choosing not to conduct
clinical studies merely for the purpose of confirming the safety and efficacy profile of
an approved medical product.8 0 In and of itself, this is not unreasonable because the
mandated expense of forever trying to prove the absence of harm in approved products
could have a negative impact on innovation. Conversely, when harm is found, courts
rarely engage in hindsight analysis to imagine what studies might have uncovered
defects that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time.
8 1
Taken together, the various elements of tort liability create a very strong incentive
for rapid and complete disclosure of safety and efficacy information. The economic
risk in attempting to market while concealing the dangers generally outweighs the
benefits, even for blockbuster drugs.8 2 However, the products liability regime is not the
exclusive source of ex post incentive forces operating upon industry; one must also
factor in the impact of state government intervention.
2. Pro-Disclosure Consumer Protection and Fair Competition
Law Incentives Fill in Tort Law Gaps
In the same way that an individual may allege an intentional failure to warn that
takes the form of common law fraud or false advertising, a similar action may be
available through consumer protection and unfair competition statutes.8 3 The incentive
structure is for all intents and purposes equivalent: economic losses may result from a
failure to disclose information that could have averted harm. Having the government as
an actor may change one's assessment of probability or impact, however.
species of the standard failure-to-warn case, wherein a manufacturer allegedly breaches a duty to
warn about dangers known or reasonably knowable. See PRODUCTS LIABILTY, supra note 63, at
§ 4.06.
79. See BECK& VALE, supra note 71, at § 2.04 [1].
80. See id. at § 3.07. California courts have recently addressed this issue. In Valentine v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 252, 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), the court determined
that no independent duty to test exists. The court declared that the "imposition of liability for
breach of an independent duty to conduct long-term testing, where the causal link to the known
harm to plaintiff is the unknown outcome of testing that was not done, would be beyond the pale
of any California tort doctrine." Id. (emphasis omitted).
81. Arguably, there is disagreement among jurisdictions on this point, but it appears that
more recent cases tend to refrain from imposing a retrospective requirement to test. See BECK &
VALE, supra note 71, at § 3.07 (citing one 1973 case essentially imposing a duty to test, but
several more recent cases in accord with the proposition that no such requirement exists).
82. In many ways, blockbuster drugs may pose even greater liability issues because they
provide so much of a company's profits that their loss can be devastating. For example, Merck's
recently withdrawn Vioxx was responsible for approximately $2.5 billion in yearly sales. See
Aaron Smith, Merck's Vioxx Bill Could Hit $50 Billion, CNN MONEY.COM, Aug. 22, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/22/news/fortune5OO/merck. The withdrawal was partially
responsible for Merck's fifty-nine percent plunge in earnings in the following year. Associated
Press, Merck Q2 Earnings Plunge on Charge, CBS NEWS.COM, July 21, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/07/2 1/ap/business/mainD8BFP808O.shtml.
83. See Garbutt & Hofmann, supra note 75, at 282-83 (describing private actions under
consumer fraud and unfair competition statutes).
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Laws that specifically address deceptive marketing (or more generally, unfair
competition) are enforced by the state84 and most include a private right of action.8 5 If
the government is involved, it may be able to benefit from certain advantages not
available to private, common-law plaintiffs. Obvious examples include greater
financial power to manage litigations, to utilize the experience of multiple cases, and
potentially to extract greater remedies-even criminal penalties in some cases.8
6
Additionally, since state statutes may prohibit false or misleading statements, per se, it
may be possible to avoid important common-law tort defenses like the learned
intermediary doctrine.8 7 Arguably, a company has a stronger incentive to consent to a
broad prospective resolution to the action, as the potential for future litigation is more
onerous than in a common law tort case to address an individual harm or a class's
common set of facts.
The use of consumer-protection and fair-competition laws to pursue product
liability issues is by no means a new idea. Some refer to this as simply another form of
regulation through litigation, 8 and it has figured prominently in cases related to such
products as lead paint and tobacco.8 9 The nature of the tobacco company litigation, in
particular, is a model for the typical assertions and issues in a medical products case. In
the context of a regulated product, containing mandated warnings and known dangers,
84. See id.
85. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19-10 (LexisNexis 2002); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17204,
17535 (West 1997 & Supp. 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-1 10g(a) (West Supp. 2006);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.211(1) (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-373 (2000); HAw. REV.
STAT. § 480-13 (Supp. 2005); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/10a (West Supp. 2006); IND.
CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4 (West Supp. 2006); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(A) (2003); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 213(1) (2002); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-408 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2003); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 93A § 9 (LexisNexis 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.31 (West
2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-18 to -19 (West 2001); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(h)
(McKinney 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-16 (West 2000); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
1345.09(B) (LexisNexis 1954, 1962, 1979, 1993,2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(a)(1)
(2001); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(Vernon Supp. 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §
2461 (b) (1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.86.090 (West 1999); see also BECK& VALE, supra
note 71, at § 3.08[1] (noting that private actions under consumer protection statutes are not
always successful due to the perception that such statutes are misused as a basis for products
liability claims); Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103
MICH. L. REv. 589, 605-06 (2005) (describing the general nature of such statutes).
86. Under consumer protection statutes, the criminal consequences are often classified as a
misdemeanor. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 1997); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.20
(McKinney 1999); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.12(d) (Vernon 2002).
87. See Garbutt & Hofinann, supra note 75, at 272-73, 282-83 (explaining the basic
assumptions of the doctrine and noting that "[p]laintiffs increasingly have tried to avoid the
effects of the learned intermediary doctrine by asserting state consumer fraud claims," but the
results have been "mixed").
88. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Overview, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 1, 7 (W. Kip
Viscusi ed., 2002); Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak, 29 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REv. 179, 203-04 (2005) (describing government regulation through litigation wherein new
enforcement powers-beyond those typically applied to a regulated entity-are exercised).
89. See Edward T. Schroeder, Note, A Tort by Any Other Name? In Search of the
Distinction Between Regulation Through Litigation and Conventional Tort Law, 83 TEx. L.
REv. 897, 900-04 (2005).
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consumers, and states on their behalf, were able to sue for harm caused by the alleged
systematic fraudulent misrepresentation of the ill effects of using the product.90 Of
course, the outcome has been quite favorable to plaintiffs, as states have been
extremely successful in extracting huge settlements, and a great deal of important
information on the addictive properties of smoking has come to light.91 The same legal
theories should apply in the context of a pharmaceutical company that covers up a
safety issue to achieve a better marketing position. And similar to tort liability,
consumer protection claims generally impact only information that companies have
generated or plan to generate.
92
Taken together, consumer protection liability and medical products liability are
presumed to act positively to increase the amount of information available while
equitably allocating the risks of product defects between manufacturers and the public.
Importantly, the ability of a strong ex post incentive track to induce information
production is predicated on the notion that liability can be fully avoided through a
company's good faith efforts. Unfortunately, the realities of litigation practice in the
United States impose a retrospective marginal cost transfer that can significantly
detract from the incentives.
II. THE TRANSPARENCY PARADOX: WHY MORE INFORMATION MEANS LESS
Since a rational assessment of medical product risks and benefits is so dependent on
accurate information, it seems logical that any effort to increase its availability would
have a positive effect. A general effort to force companies to disclose more information
should provide for greater safety and smarter choices. However, this presumption is
based on an incomplete picture. Specifically, it fails to take into account the fact that
the above information incentive forces can be countered by the significant tort
disincentives that accompany disclosure. Because greater disclosure enhances the
disincentive effect, it is actually possible for an increase in information disclosure to
result in less information creation such that production is reduced overall. This is the
information paradox, and it confounds efforts to enhance the public's ability to
exercise its judgment regarding the use of medical products.
90. See Wendy E. Wagner, Rough Justice and the Attorney General Litigation, 33 GA. L.
REv. 935, 957-61 (1999) (detailing the organization of the collaborative attorneys general
lawsuits against tobacco companies and why such action was necessary as a cure to the failure of
private litigation); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 528-530 (1992) (holding that
common law failure-to-warn actions are not precluded by federal labeling statutes).
91. See Wagner, supra note 90, at 966 (drawing conclusions as to the ultimate success of
the attorneys general lawsuits).
92. This is because the cause of action is generally based on fraud, including "'deception,
misrepresentation, concealment [or] suppression' of a material fact"---in other words,
misrepresenting existing clinical data-rather than a failure to investigate potential safety
problems. See Complaint at 17, New York v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, No. 04401707 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County June 2, 2004) [hereinafter Glaxo Complaint], available at http://www.oag.
state.ny.us/ press/2004/jun/jun2b_04_attachl.pdf(quoting N.Y. ExEc. L. § 63(12) (alteration in
original).
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A. The Perverse Disincentives Created by Modern Tort Practice
The modem practice of mass tort litigation has evolved to create significant
pressures on businesses that extend beyond traditional loss-avoidance incentives. These
litigation pressures could be referred to as "practice-based" since they emanate from
the methods and procedures employed by attorneys. Unlike conventional tort
incentives, practice-based forces operate not to induce loss-avoidance, specifically, but
rather to compel litigation-avoidance strategies. They derive from information
distortions caused by the reactive, experimental nature of tort litigations, wherein
liability may be sought without regard to clear evidence of negligent behavior.93 The
impact of practice-based forces is even greater when a large plaintiff pool exists. 94 In
view of the limitations on ex ante and ex post incentives, practice-based pressures may
lead companies to make an obvious but unfortunate strategic choice to avoid the
litigation morass: create less information.
The net disincentive effect of practice-based incentives arises from the combination
of the fact that tort and consumer protection incentives do not compel information
creation95 with the axiomatic imposition of tort costs following a negative disclosure.96
In part, this is a consequence of the fact that newly discovered safety or efficacy
problems can shift the risk-benefit balance.97 A manufacturer-sponsored study to
investigate new patient populations or uncover long-term effects may backfire by
revealing previously unknown problems.98 Such information may even remove the
deference to a regulatory review that occurred without the benefit of the study,
93. This can be characterized as inefficiency based on incomplete information. See CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMICS OF U.S. TORT LIABILITY: A PRIMER 14-16 (2003) [hereinafter
CBO REPORT]. It can outweigh the benefits of the deterrent function of tort law, if sufficiently
large. See id.; GARNER, supra note 10, at 180-83 (discussing the incentives produced by actual
litigation and how they are significantly less efficient than the ideal of the tort system due to
information distortions such as the uncertainty of liability).
94. For example, given the tens of millions of patients that take a drug like Vioxx, "[elven a
fraction of a percent excess in the rate of serious [illness] would translate into thousands of
affected people." Eric J. Topol, Failing the Public Health-Rofecoxib, Merck, and the FDA, 351
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1707, 1708 (2004).
95. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
96. See Andrew E. Flasetti, Fluoxetine-Induced Suicidal Ideation: An Examination of the
Medical Literature, Case Law, and the Legal Liability of Drug Manufacturers, 57 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 273, 290-92 (2002) (describing Eli Lilly's experience with selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitors (SSRI) pharmaceutical litigations at the turn of the twenty-first century, and
arguing "while Lilly has yet to know defeat, the real loser likely will be the patient suffering
from depression, as the pharmaceutical industry may limit or halt the production of products as a
result of manufacturers repeatedly being found liable for purported effects of their products that
have no rational basis of support in the scientific literature"). In some jurisdictions, the failure to
warn is judged as a strict liability tort, meaning the reasonableness of a manufacturer's actions is
irrelevant. See BECK & VALE, supra note 71, at § 2.04[ 1].
97. See BECK & VALE, supra note 71, at § 3.02[5] ("'If new information later tips the
balance toward the risk of a product, or if new developments make possible a safer design, at
that point further distributions of the product are not protected by comment k."' (quoting Toner
v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 307 (Idaho 1987))); supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
98. See Struve, supra note 10, at 602 (describing the countervailing forces in disclosing
negative information in terms of liability and business losses).
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depending on the jurisdiction. 99 The liability costs of such a study are therefore added
on to a firm's marginal costs retrospectively.'
00
Presenting an even greater liability issue is the fact that frequently a study with
negative outcomes may confirm a problem that, in retrospect, was suggested by earlier
evidence.' 0 1 Invariably, this opens up the possibility for a failure-to-warn action based
on a lack of response to the known issues. As one plaintiff's attorney put it in
comments on the attractiveness of Viagra lawsuits, "[a]nytime you get news of a post-
market adverse event that is as serious as blindness, heart attack, stroke, the first thing
you expect is that the company already knew about the problem."'' 0 2 In view of this
extreme liability, a manufacturer may reasonably conclude that the risks of generating
potentially harmful information outweigh the benefits.1
0 3
99. Professor Rabin cites this use of tort law as a means of bridging the gap in regulatory
review and as an important function of private litigation. See Rabin, supra note 10, at 2077.
100. A case in point is pharmaceutical company Wyeth's recent experience with its hormone
replacement therapy (HRT), Prempro. Evidence available at the time Prempro was released
suggested that such estrogen-progestin combination products could have a prophylactic effect
on heart disease; thus, many women were prescribed the drug for this off-label indication. See
Writing Group for the Women's Health Initiative, Risks and Benefits ofEstrogen Plus Progestin
in Healthy Postmenopausal Women, 288 JAMA 321, 321-22 (2002). To further investigate the
benefits of HRT, a long-term, randomized clinical trial was designed by the Women's Health
Initiative, sponsored by the federal government, and aided by Wyeth's contribution of all
medications used. See id. at 332. Stunningly, the trial contradicted previous findings and
determined that the use of HRT actually increased the risk of heart attack. Id. at 330-31 ("At the
end of the trial, the global index indicated that there were more harmful than beneficial
outcomes in the estrogen plus progestin group vs [sic] the placebo group."). Not surprisingly,
Wyeth faced the prospect of massive individual and class action litigation for alleged Prempro
harm, primarily for the potential future impacts. See, e.g., Melissa Nann Burke, Judge Rejects
Class Action for Monitoring of Prempro Users, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 4,2005, available
at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 115111119293 (certification of a class of over
700,000 women attempted but ultimately denied). Although the first of the "bellwether" cases
ended favorably for Wyeth, Today in Business, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 16, 2006, at C2, the company
has lost others and still faces approximately 5000 lawsuits. Wyeth to Pay $3 Million in Cancer
Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2007, at C4. The class action filings are particularly interesting for
their employment of the relatively novel request for "medical monitoring" of currently healthy
patients due to the increased risk of heart attack. Id. If successful, it is possible that this new
form of liability could become a significant burden for pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies. See David M. Studdert, Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Medical
Monitoring for Pharmaceutical Injuries, 289 JAMA 889, 893 (2003).
101. The Vioxx study is, of course, the most prominent example. See Anna Wilde Mathews
& Barbara Martinez, E-Mails Suggest Merck Knew Vioxx's Dangers at Early Stage, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 1, 2004, at A1; Barry Meier, Merck Canceled an Early Study of Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2005, at Cl.
102. See Justin Scheck, Attorneys Soft on Viagra Suits, RECORDER, June 15,2005, available
at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 118739911459; see also Justin Scheck, Product
Defect May Set Lawyer's Hearts Racing, RECORDER, June 24, 2005, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 119517513020 ("There's nothing like a short-circuit
inside thousands of people's chest cavities to jump-start plaintiff lawyers and shock the heart of
a corporate defendant.").
103. Note that the clinical trials themselves are not without liability risk. Recently,
pharmaceutical companies have come under fire on a number of claims related to clinical
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The liability that follows disclosure is daunting enough, but practice-based tort
forces further exacerbate the problem. In particular, information-creation disincentives
are compounded by the increasing sophistication' 4 of plaintiffs' attorneys in initiating
lawsuits based on the early indications of a problem with an FDA-approved medical
product. 0 5 For example, one of the largest and best-known lobbying groups for trial
attorneys, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA),10 6 provides "litigation
packets" containing specific advice, strategies, and even sample pleadings for lawyers
interested in taking on clients harmed by drugs with as yet unclear risk-benefit profiles
like Vioxx. 0 7 The production of such information is rapid, and manufacturers could
reasonably be concerned that safety issues may be litigated before conclusive evidence
is available. According to some observers, the goal of much early-stage litigation is a
fast settlement.1 0 8 Within a year of the disclosure of cardiac safety concerns with
Vioxx, over four thousand cases were filed against manufacturer Merck & Co.,' 0 9 and
the number has grown to over twenty-eight thousand. 1 0 However, after winning nine
out of fourteen trials as of the beginning of 2007, l l ' it is not at all clear that Merck
acted wrongfully in all-or even many---of those lawsuits." 2 There are indications that
research, including wrongful death and the right to continue receiving drugs after the trial has
ended. See Tresa Baldas, Drug Trials on Trial, NAT'L L.J., July 18, 2005, at 1.
104. Television and Internet advertising are now common ways for plaintiffs' attorneys to
generate clients with injuries possibly related to specific drugs under public scrutiny. See
Andrew Harris, Law Firm's Vioxx Campaign Draws Audience-and Raises Questions,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 2005, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 110881109096
(describing an attorney's advertising campaign that includes advertising as well as a series of
free dinner seminars); Leigh Jones, Class Action Web Sites Untested, NAT'L L.J., July. 8, 2005
(discussing the issues in the use of websites to solicit clients related to products like Paxil).
105. See Five Plaintiffs File Worldwide Class Action Saying Drug Caused Heart Attacks,
Embolism, 33 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 399 (Apr. 18, 2005); Wave of Class
Action Litigation Follows Merck's Withdrawal ofArthritis Drug VIOXX, 32 Prod. Safety &
Liab. Rep. (BNA), No. 43, at 996 (Nov. 1, 2004).
106. ATLA recently voted to change its name to the American Association for Justice. See
Editorial, Trial Lawyers for Justice, L.A.TIMES, Aug. 11, 2006, at B 12.
107. See Am. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, Exchange Litigation Packet, http://www.atla.org/
LegalResearchServices/Tier3/Lit%20Packet%20Flyer Current.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2006)
("Begin your search with ATLA Exchange Litigation Packets, and you'll gain practical, valuable
case materials such as deposition transcripts and summaries, pleadings, trial transcripts,
company manuals, and bibliographies of relevant reference materials.").
108. See, e.g., Michelle M. Bufano, Keep from Drowning in a Sea of Mass Torts!, PHARM. &
MED. DEVICE L. BULL., Jan. 22, 2004, at 1 ("Keeping in mind that the goal of mass tort
litigations is early settlement, a defendant's most important goal is to expose frivolous claims
early.").
109. Alex Berenson, First Vioxx Suit: Entryway into LegalLabyrinth?, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2005, at Cl.
110. Tesoriero, supra note 6. See also Barnaby J. Feder, Lawyers Set to Bring More Suits,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2005, at C5 (stating that the FDA's decision to ban Bextra and add
warnings to Celebrex "galvanized the informal network of lawyers pursuing death and injury
suits aimed at the two drugs").
111. Tesoriero, supra note 6.
112. In fact, a recent investigation conducted by former U.S. District Judge John S. Martin
concluded that the company did not act inappropriately or mislead the public with respect to
Vioxx. REPORT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN S. MARTIN, JR. TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF MERCK & CO, INC. CONCERNING THE CONDUCT OF SENIOR
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the number of early stage, reactive lawsuits is increasing across the medical product
industry, 1"3 even as other mass torts may be waning." 
4
Even if a firm has acted responsibly and could prove it in court, it is not always
clear that the tort system will yield reliable results. This is due in large part to problems
the civil jury-the trier of fact in most products liability cases-will likely experience
in making the necessary risk-benefit assessments.115 Evidence from litigation
concerning drugs like Bendectin, medical devices like breast implants, and vaccines
suggests that juries are not always good at assessing whether the harm in a particular
case is outweighed by societal benefits.116 The uncertainty of jury verdicts can,
completely aside from the merits of the case, dissuade corporate defendants from
undertaking the risk of litigation. 17 Additionally, cases involving large numbers of
plaintiffs are ripe for fraud, which can dramatically drive up the costs. In a recent,
dramatic example, a Duke University professor's audit of claims approved in the
massive class action settlement concerning Wyeth's fen-phen drug found that seventy
percent were manipulated and should have been denied.'"
8
As a result of these transferred costs, manufacturers will likely be driven to
undertake a course of reduced information production." 9 From an economic
MANAGEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND MARKETING OF VIOXX 176-79 (Sept. 5, 2006),
available at http://161.58.184.45/martinreport/. The objectivity of the report has been
questioned, as it was prepared at the request of Merck's board of directors. John Carreyrou &
Heather Won Tesoriero, Merck Vioxx Probe Clears Officials, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2006, at D3
("Plaintiffs' attorneys dismissed the investigation as a whitewashing exercise.").
113. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Trial Lawyers Are Now Focusing on Lawsuits Against Drug
Makers, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2003, at Al (describing a new wave of products liability litigation
in the pharmaceutical industry and noting that "the new lawsuits are much larger, covering more
drugs and many more plaintiffs").
114. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal states that companies facing some of the
largest and most controversial litigations, involving products such as asbestos and silica, are
seeing a significant decline. Paul Davies, Plaintiffs' Lawsuits Against Companies Sharply
Decline, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2006, at Al. However, it is not clear that this drop has much
connection to the pharmaceutical mass torts described above. See id. ("Despite the tougher
landscape, plaintiffs' lawyers are pushing ahead with a number of large-scale new actions
[against Wyeth and Merck].").
115. See Stewart, supra note 10, at 2171-73 ("[T]he tort litigation system generates seriously
erroneous and inconsistent liability decisions, and results in over-deterrence with respect to
regulated products that present complex scientific and technical questions regarding risk,
benefit, and causation.").
116. See id. (reviewing specific cases wherein jury verdicts appear to be at odds with reliable
evidence and reasonable assessments).
117. See Daniel R. Cahoy & Min Ding, Using Experimental Economics to Peek into the
"Black Box" of Jury Behavior: A Proposal for Jury Research Reform, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 31, 40-44 (2004).
118. See Frankel, supra note 4 (describing the use of attorney "echo mills"-mass plaintiff
processing sites screening for heart problems-and citing a study conducted by Dr. Joseph
Kisslo of 926 claims that have passed through the settlement trust auditing system).
119. At the very least, the transferred costs may result in the termination of current studies
that could produce dangerous outcomes. See, e.g., Benjamin Falit, The Path to Cheaper and
Safer Drugs: Revamping the Pharmaceutical Industry in Light of GlaxoSmithKine's Settlement,
33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 174, 176 (2005) ("Aware that summaries of all completed trials will
inevitably be released to the public, pharmaceutical companies will rationally choose to
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perspective, it is the most rational course of action. If one presumes that manufacturers
engage in voluntary information creation and disclosure to the extent that the marginal
benefits of the studies (e.g., generating evidence of market advantages, discovering
latent defects early to permit loss avoidance, and disclosing revised efficacy profiles to
reduce patient risk) are equal to the marginal costs of the studies and future liability
based on the information produced, a certain amount of information will be available to
the public (see figure 1).120
MC,
MCLM
MB
t1 Q1 Quantity of Information
Figure 1. Ex Post Liability Impact on Voluntary Information Production. The marginal cost curve reflects the
increased costs to the firm of producing additional information following approval. The marginal benefits
curve reflects the benefits ofprodlucing information in terms ofa firm's ability to internalize future harm from
discovered defects. At the equilibrium point, the quantity of information "Qr, will be produced. The legal
system Is ex post transfer of the costs of past harm revealed by additional information is represented by curve
MCL. Thus, liability resulting from new information can be expected to reduce the quantity ofinformatin to
QIL.
However, when liability is applied to the disclosure of information, regardless of
one's negligence or otherwise bad acts, the marginal costs of information production
increase retrospectively (see curve MCL). That should move the equilibrium point of
information costs and benefits back and thus suggests that a company will view less
information as optimally efficient (see point QIJ) Significantly, this information-
production disincentive could blunt both ex ante and ex post incentives to the extent
they are voluntary.
Even if in some cases the economic consequences of practice-based liability are not
so severe as to warrant a change in information production, it is quite possible that a
company may employ a loss-avoidance heuristic that compels the same result.
Heuristics are simple rules that reflect a decision maker's perception of his or her
environment. 1 2 They are not always accurate and may be skewed by anecdotal
prematurely terminate projects that are likely to produce negative results.") (emphasis in
original).
120. Note that information produced to the public, Ql, is a function of both information
creation and disclosure.
121. See GARBER, supra note 10, at 69-71 ; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty." Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124-25 (1974) [hereinafter
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evidence of the bad outcomes of others. 22 For example, a company may choose to
avoid a course of action with substantial risks if that company or an industry cohort has
faced extreme losses in the past for similar actions.'23 As a general matter, companies
perceive litigation risks as greater than their actual economic impact. 24 Therefore, a
heuristic for information production is likely to err on the side of less exposure.
25
Possible liability-avoidance measures a company might employ in response to either
real or perceived liability risks include: (1) limiting the range of clinical studies that
must be generated for approval by seeking a narrow indication; 26 (2) declining to
engage in an independent evaluation of adverse incident reports; and, most
importantly, (3) never initiating a postmarketing (phase IV) study unless absolutely
necessary. As a result of ex post disincentives, opportunities to uncover serious safety
and efficacy issues could be lost, and the health care environment could become
significantly riskier. 127
Tversky & Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases]. Another way to look at the phenomenon is the
"prospect theory" of decision making. This involves narrow outcome "framing" based on norms,
habits, and expectancies of the decision maker and the weighting of those outcomes based on
properties such as whether the decision maker places great value on loss aversion. Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251,
S257-60 (1986). Both concepts have been quite influential in management theory and political
science. See Jack S. Levy, Daniel Kahneman: Judgment, Decision, andRationality, 35 POL. SCI.
& POL. 271, 271 (2002).
122. See Steven Garber, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and
Economic Outcomes, 1998 WIS. L. REv. 237, 249-251 (1998) (describing the misperceptions
corporate decisionmakers are likely to incorporate into a tort liability assessment heuristic);
Tversky & Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases, supra note 121, at 1124.
123. See Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Media as
Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort Litigation, 20 L. & HuM. BEHAV.
419, 420 (1996).
124. See GARBER, supra note 10, at 73 (noting that potential liability costs are often
perceived as being much more substantial than they actually are).
125. See Cass Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages
(with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2077 (1998) ("[Als a
practical matter, a risk of extremely high awards is likely to produce excessive caution in risk-
averse managers and companies.") (citing KENNETH R. MACCRIMMON & DONALD A. WEHRUNG,
TAKING RIsKS: THE MANAGEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY (1986)).
126. Because uses outside of the approved indications are available through off-label use,
manufacturers may be allowed to retain these profits without the use risk. However, if there is
insufficient support for off-label use, there is a risk in any related promotion manufacturers
undertake. See Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing ofFDA-Approved
Drugs: An Assessment ofLegislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REv. 181,205-06 n. 152
(1999) (describing arguments against permitting off-label use and explaining why they may be
overstated).
127. Although reform of the tort system is a hot political topic, see, e.g., Mark Silva, Bush's
Tort Reform Efforts to Start at "Judicial Hellhole," CHI. TRIB., Jan. 3, 2005, at 9 (detailing tort
reform points pushed by the Bush administration and reflected in the President's visit to
Madison County, Illinois, notorious for its mass tort filings), it is not entirely clear that this issue
would normally be included in the push. For example, plaintiffs' attorneys would likely be
reluctant to accept that there could be negative safety implications to tort litigation, and
manufacturers would also seem less than inclined to admit that any safety study was foregone
due to purely economic reasons.
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B. Complete Information Disclosure Ratchets Up Production Disincentives
Most of the practice-based issues described above arise only when the information
becomes public. As noted previously, there are many instances where manufacturers
can generate information outside of the public eye 128 and in some cases, beyond the
scrutiny of regulators.129 There is, as a result, still somewhat of a de facto safe harbor
for detailed clinical investigations that can provide information about medical
products. It may permit additional information creation while providing a great
incentive for secrecy when a problem is discovered, an arguably less than ideal result.
But change is afoot. Recently, the push for greater transparency in the medical
product development process has led to a marked increase in disclosure incentives for
several sources. More and more, companies are being called upon to immediately
release information that is potentially relevant to the safety-efficacy equation. 30 This
trend is likely to only increase. However, the continued pressure to quickly disclose
information that can lead to legal liability may create ever-greater incentives for
companies to refrain from creating the information in the first place. Thus,
paradoxically, efforts to increase the flow of information may end up playing a role in
reducing a large portion of it.
1. Increased Use of Government Online Clinical Study Databases
Before one can assess the information in a clinical trial, one must obviously know of
its existence. This is actually a significant obstacle in the case of preapproval studies
due to regulatory confidentiality protections. In a rather dramatic change in the
information environment, the existence and details of such clinical trials are now being
widely disseminated on Internet-based registries.' 31 One registry, known as
"ClinicalTrials.gov,"' 3 2 is particularly significant in this regard because it is a
government initiative and participation is mandatory for certain types of trials-it
effectively trumps standard confidentiality.' 33 Any study that concerns the effectiveness
of a drug for the treatment of a "serious or life-threatening disease or condition" must
be registered on the database. 134 Members of the general public can find information
128. In particular, one should note the significant amount of information submitted to the
FDA during the approval process that may be held in confidence. See supra notes 24-30 and
accompanying text.
129. While it is difficult to imagine much information related to drugs that could be withheld
from the FDA, biologics and medical devices have an opening for voluntary postmarketing
studies. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Dickersin & Rennie, supra note 9, at 517-18.
131. The concept of mandatory clinical trial registries is actually not new; there have been
limited registries since the 1960s. See id. at 518 (describing the early existence of clinical trial
registries and noting that some were even searchable by computer). However, the accessibility
provided by the Internet has breathed new life into such proposals.
132. The name of the database, maintained by the National Institutes of Health and
developed by the National Library of Medicine, intuitively discloses its Web address:
http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
133. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
134. 42 U.S.C.A. § 282(j)(3)(A) (2006). See also CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND
RESEARCH & CENTER FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FDA., GUIDANCE FOR
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about what drugs are being tested, where the trials are taking place, and who is
sponsoring them, among other significant facts. 135 In truth, the database is somewhat
limited as a safety or efficacy disclosure device because it does not always present the
results of the trials. 136 However, the registry can be a starting point for locating
information on safety or efficacy issues related to an approved drug. Once the
existence of a study is disclosed, simply concealing the results may be an ineffective
way ofpreventing negative information from escaping. The mere discrepancy between
available drug study results and any additional trials listed on a website like
ClinicalTrials.gov may be enough to provide a roadmap for compelling production
during litigation discovery. At the least, it may create a strong presumption that the
findings of the undisclosed study were unfavorable.' 
37
Unlike preapproval clinical studies, the existence of all postapproval clinical studies
concerning drugs or biologics that were either required by the FDA or agreed upon by
the applicant are considered public information. 138 This is a relatively recent change
that resulted from the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997.139
Significantly, postapproval studies undertaken on an applicant's own initiative are not
subject to the public disclosure provisions. 140 What has changed since 1997 is that the
INDUSTRY: INFORMATION PROGRAM ON CLINICAL TRIALS FOR SERIOUS OR LIFE-THREATENING
DISEASES AND CONDITIONS 2 (2002), available at www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/clintria031802.pdf
[hereinafter CLINICAL TRIALS GUIDANCE] (stating that § 282(j)(3)(A) requires the submission of
information regarding clinical trials to test effectiveness). Non-effectiveness trials or trials
concerning conditions not serious or life-threatening may also be submitted to the database. Id.
The database is the result of the amendments made by the Food & Drug Administration
Modernization Act. See Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (codified in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.). See also Charles Marwick, Implementing the FDA Modernization Act,
279 JAMA 815, 815 (1998).
135. See CLINICAL TRIALS GUIDANCE, supra note 134, at 3 (listing the information to be
disclosed to the clinical trial registry).
136. See id. at 7-8 (describing other information that can be voluntarily linked to a database
entry). This is likely due to the fact that ClinicalTrials.gov was created at the behest of patient
advocacy groups (particularly those concerned with less treatable conditions like AIDS and
cancer) as a trial-locating device rather than a tool for evaluating safety data. See Alexa T.
McCray, Better Access to Information about Clinical Trials, 133 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED.
609, 610 (2000) (describing, in the words of ClinicalTrial.gov's creator, the origin and intent of
the database).
137. Although it is not axiomatic that an unpublished study-one that essentially disappears
from the public eye because it is abandoned or never submitted to ajournal-has uncovered a
problem, evidence exists that such studies tend to be more unfavorable than those that are
published. See Dickersin & Rennie, supra note 9, at 517.
138. 21 U.S.C. § 356b(b) (2000).
139. Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 130, 111 Stat. 2296,2331 (1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 356b
(2000)). Interestingly, the FDA's authority to require medical device manufacturers to undertake
postmarketing surveillance was actually weakened in 1998 as a result of FDAMA. See CENTER
FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF:
SMDA TO FDAMA: GUIDANCE ON FDA'S TRANSITION PLAN FOR EXISTING POSTMARKET
SURVEILLANCE PROTOCOLS 1 (Nov. 2, 1998). available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/
98fr/980108gd.pdf (stating that the former automatic requirement to conduct postmarketing
surveillance has been limited to situations in which the failure of the device would have serious
health consequences, is life-sustaining, or will be used in the body for more than one year).
140. See FDAMA 130 GUIDANCE, supra note 37, at4 ("Voluntary studies are not subject to
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FDA also lists basic information about each such trial in a searchable database
available on its website.14' The results of the trials, however, are subject to the same
confidentiality protections as preapproval studies.142 Moreover, they are not provided
in redacted form alongside the preapproval studies on the Web. 43 However, compared
to the availability of any of the above information only a few years ago, the content
available on FDA websites is substantial, creating a serious litigation risk.
2. Medical Journals and Early Clinical Trial Citation
Concerned by the role that medical journals play in disseminating misleading
information, editors of prominent publications have long sought to find a way to reduce
the likelihood of study-selection bias.l 44 In 2004, the International Committee of
Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE), a group that includes members from such
prestigious journals as the Journal of the American Medical Association, the New
England Journal of Medicine, and the British journal Lancet, met to revise its Uniform
Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals ("Requirements"). 145
The Requirements reflect a voluntary agreement of basic standards for the review and
publication of medical and scientific information. To effectuate change, the members
included a relatively minor requirement for disclosure prior to publication, but in doing
so, this minor requirement set in motion a potentially important limitation on secrecy.
The change adopted in the Requirements creates a new obligation on authors to
register clinical trials as a precondition to consideration for publication. 46 To satisfy
the ICMJE, the trial registry must be public and accessible without charge. 147
Moreover, it must be open to all submitters and electronically searchable, and it must
include a mechanism to ensure the validity of the registration data. 48 It appears that the
only registry that would qualify would be either a federal government-maintained
website like ClinicalTrials.gov or a neutral, third-party website like Thomson's
CenterWatch or the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America's
(PhRMA) ClinicalStudyResults.org.149 Private company databases would presumably
506B's reporting requirements ... ").
141. See Postmarketing Study Commitments, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/
pmc/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
142. See FDAMA 130 GUIDANCE, supra note 37, at 15 ("[The] FDA will not make public
any trade secrets, or any information that, if disclosed, might cause an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.") (internal citations omitted).
143. While preapproval studies are available on the FDA website, they are located in a
separate database from postmarketing reports. See Drugs@FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
scripts/cder/drugsatfda/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
144. See AMA, supra note 53 (describing several forms of medical research bias).
145. See Benjamin Falit, Pharma's Commitment to Maintaining a Clinical Trial Register:
Increased Transparency or Contrived Public Appeasement, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHics 391, 392
(2005).
146. ICJME, UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS FOR MANUSCRIPTS SUBMITTED TO BIOMEDICAL
JOURNALS: WRITING AND EDITING FOR BIOMEDICAL PUBLICATION 21 (2006), http://www.icmje.
org/icmje.pdf ("The ICMJE member journals will require, as a condition of consideration for
publication in their journals, registration in a public trial registry.").
147. Id. at 22.
148. Id.
149. The ICMJE issued a joint statement in 2004 in which it declared that the only registry
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be too likely to vary in the quantity and quality of information and could perhaps
incorporate bias.
As a result of the Requirements, a company must decide to make certain disclosures
about a trial before the results are known if there is ever to be a chance of publishing in
a prominent journal. If a medical product is to reach blockbuster status, this may be an
incentive too great to ignore. There is evidence that the publication requirement is
already having an effect 150 by increasing the number of disclosures to
ClinicalTrials.gov and thereby reducing the tendency toward nondisclosure of trial
information.
3. Legislative Proposals to Foreclose Opportunities to
Retain Information in Confidence
To further reduce information asymmetry, some advocates urge the adoption of new
federal legislation. Two recent efforts in Congress utilizing different approaches typify
the call for reform: one seeks to increase the amount of information subject to
mandatory disclosure via government information portals, while the other would have
increased the penalties for failing to disclose important information.
The Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act ("FACT Act") of 2007 provides for a greatly
expanded government clinical-studies database that would include a registry of new
trials and, significantly, a results database. 151 Participation in the FACT Act database
would be mandatory for both publicly and privately funded trials from the phase II
stage forward.152 In essence, the bill takes the ClinicalTrials.gov database and removes
its "serious or life-threatening diseases and conditions" limitation. 153 Additionally, the
FACT Act attempts to rein in the information disclosure restrictions on parties to
contract research by prohibiting limits or unreasonable delay in discussing or
publishing the results of clinical trials.' 54 To ensure manufacturers do not take their
research overseas to retain confidentiality, the bill also contains a section that would,
under certain circumstances, include foreign clinical trials within the disclosure
rules. 155 The other congressional reform effort, the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers Accountability Act of 2005 ("PhRMA Act"), was introduced in the
109th Congress but did not become law.' 56 It was directed to drugs only and would
have increased the penalties for violations of existing FDA rules relating to adverse
known to meet all its criteria is ClinicalTrials.gov. Catherine D. DeAngelis et al., Clinical Trial
Registration: A Statement From the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 292
JAMA, 1363, 1364 (2004). But it left open the possibility that other registries could satisfy the
ICMJE's requirements. Id.
150. See Deborah A. Zarin, Tony Tse & Nicholas Ide, Trial Registration at
ClinicalTrials.gov Between May and October 2005, 353 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2779,2784 (2005)
(finding a seventy-three percent increase in trial registrations on the government website,
ClinicalTrials.gov, following the adoption of the Requirements).
151. S. 467, 110th Cong. at § 3(a)(3) (2007). Another bill, the Enhancing Drug Safety and
Innovation Act of 2007, combines the expanded database provisions of the FACT Act with new
requirements for FDA risk evaluation and mitigation strategies. See S. 484, 110th Cong. (2007).
152. See S. 467 § 3(a)(3).
153. See 42 U.S.C.A § 282(j)(3)(A) (2006).
154. S.467 § 5.
155. Id. § 3(n).
156. H.R. 870, 109th Cong. (2005).
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incidents.1 57 Specifically, the PhRMA Act raised the penalties for knowingly
concealing information related to a "serious adverse drug experience"-a new
subcategory of the general failure to adhere to the FDA's reporting requirements
described in the current statute-from one year and one thousand dollars to twenty
years and two million dollars.1 58 Most interesting is that this new liability was to be
placed exclusively on either the CEO of the manufacturing company or on a member of
the senior executive management group.' 59 Additionally, the bill contained an
attestation of compliance provision directed to the company CEO that smacks of
Sarbanes-Oxley-style accountability. 160 The clear message is that the rules are
adequate, but better enforcement is needed. Given reports of noncompliance with
current regulations in key areas,' 61 that sentiment may be accurate as far as it goes and
the bill could see reintroduction in the 110th Congress.
Because provisions like those in the PhRMA Act and the FACT Act can work side-
by-side without conflict, it is possible that both could eventually become law. Indeed,
they would also seem to complement other existing information-disclosure incentives
without creating a preemption issue. Although the bills are somewhat duplicative of the
disclosure incentives provided by either publication standards or state tort liability,
there is arguably some additional force and consistency to enacting the rules into
federal law.
4. More Aggressive Consumer Protection Litigation
Because consumer protection litigation is a field often directed by elected officials,
it may be largely fueled by public outrage over industry behavior. If medical product
companies believed that public policy or some other consideration insulated them from
landing in that position, all doubt was eliminated in the summer of 2004. In the wake of
the alleged suppression of important clinical trials related to the use of antidepressants,
the New York State Attorney General's Office pursued a campaign against several
drug manufacturers over their efforts to selectively keep studies confidential. 162 New
York first filed suit against GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) for fraud in concealing studies
regarding the effectiveness of SSRI inhibitors-specifically, the antidepressant
medication paroxetine-in treating children with Major Depressive Disorder
(MDD). 63 The complaint included several factual allegations suggesting that GSK
157. Id. § 2(a).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 302(a), 906(a), 116 Stat.
745, 777, 806 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (Supp IV 2004)); H.R. 870 at §
2(b).
161. See infra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
162. See Gardiner Harris, Glaxo Agrees to Post Results of Drug Trials on Web Site, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at C4 (describing a settlement with GlaxoSmithKline and citing New
York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's threat to pursue similar actions against Eli Lilly, Johnson
& Johnson, and Merck).
163. See Glaxo Complaint, supra note 92, at 1; Barbara Martinez, Spitzer Charges Glaxo
Concealed Paxil Data, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2004, at B 1. The complaint against GSK was
brought under a New York statute authorizing the Attorney General to enjoin fraudulent or
illegal business acts. See N.Y. EXEC. L. § 63(12) (McKinney 2002).
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promoted the off-label use of paroxetine in children while simultaneously concealing
negative information 64 Significantly, much of the negative information impacted
efficacy (or the lack thereof) as opposed to safety. A subsequent inquiry was initiated
against Forest Labs regarding the marketing of its antidepressants Lexapro and
Celexa. 1
65
The results of the New York actions were swift and significant. The initial
litigations quickly settled with powerful consent decrees requiring much broader
disclosure of clinical trials.166 Several other companies under scrutiny announced the
initiation of their own websites to list clinical trials and results in order to ward off
litigation. 167 The information provided is not necessarily comprehensive as
manufacturers may choose slightly different levels of disclosure; nor is it convenient
since it rests on several Internet locations instead of a central database.168 But the
response certainly worked to create greater access to clinical study data,
complementing the efforts of private tort litigation as well as regulatory and scientific
incentives.
The New York Attorney General's Office essentially created a model for other
states by undertaking such an aggressive and creative role in the information-disclosure
controversy. Many state statutes lend themselves to an action similar to New York's. 1
69
When another controversy erupts regarding an alleged failure to disclose information,
the call for reparations may come from one or many of these jurisdictions. Given the
success of New York, the chances of such litigation are increased.
The combination of online registries, publication rules, and new government action
may render the secret clinical study a thing of the past. Although initial public
statements of companies suggest eager compliance with the new transparency
regime, 170 their actual response may be less than desired. Assuming the existence of the
same practice-based tort disincentives described above, a rational company must
consider the costs of increased information disclosure. Greater opportunities for the
production of negative information will lead to more litigation risk, which in turn
164. Glaxo Complaint, supra note 92, at 7-11.
165. See Press Release, Office of N.Y. Att'y Gen., Forest Labs to Establish Clinical Trials
Registry (Sept. 7, 2004), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/sep/sep7b_04.html
(noting that a settlement with Forest resulted from a June 2004 inquiry by the Attorney
General's Office).
166. See, e.g., id.; Consent Order & Judgment, New York v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, No. 04-
CV-5304 MGC (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26,2004), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/
aug/aug26a 04 attachl.pdf.
167. See Sabine Vollmer, Some Pharmaceutical Firms to Begin Posting Results of Clinical
Trials Online, NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 29, 2004, at 1.
168. See Berenson, supra note 6 (contrasting the comprehensive efforts of Eli Lilly to post
trials with the paltry efforts of Pfizer and Merck).
169. The best evidence of this comes again from the tobacco company litigations. Forty-six
state attorneys general were able to use their enforcement powers to pursue companies for, inter
alia, their concealment and suppression of the true health effects of tobacco. See, e.g., Margaret
A. Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic, and Political Legacy of the
Government's Tobacco Litigation, 33 CoNN. L. REV. 1143, 1156-61 (2001) (quoting a tobacco
company lawyer describing, somewhat derisively, the causes of action involved in the cases).
170. See Berenson, supra note 6 (noting Eli Lilly's promise to disclose all results for all
drugs it sells, but suggesting other companies are less forthcoming).
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increases the marginal costs of information production (see figure 2, curve MCT). That
should reset the cost-benefit equilibrium point such that information will be produced
at a lower level (QIT).
SMCM
MC
0
MB
QIT QI L Q1 Quantity of Information
Figure 2. Impact of Increased Transparency. The marginal cost curve MCx reflects the increased costs of ex
post liability transfer stemming from a more transparent information regime. The additional costs further
reduce the quantity of information produced to QIT levels.
Thus, increased transparency would be expected to result in a more dangerous
information environment unless some means of absorbing the additional costs is
employed.
In fact, cost absorption is a realistic solution to the problem, and there are several
possible routes to achieving this. The most effective will utilize the power of the
market and expertise of the firm, but any measure would have a more favorable impact
than increasing only transparency without regard to production.
111. EMPLOYING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION-CREATION
INCENTIVES To RESOLVE THE PARADOX
To optimally induce the production of safety and efficacy information, one must
reduce or eliminate the impact of tort disincentives without wiping out all of the
beneficial effects of products liability law. One can envision a number of possibilities
for enhancing minor parts of the existing environment. But to ensure significant and
lasting impact, there are essentially two distinct courses from which to choose. One is a
market-based solution that will make use of the diffuse knowledge that is in the hands
of industry. This article proposes such a mechanism and suggests that it is the best
option due to the political desirability and economic efficiency of increasing the
incentives for a private company to conduct clinical studies on its own initiative. A
more heavy-handed and direct approach would be to connect the FDA's assessment to
tort duties by preempting state product liability law when a valid federal approval is
obtained. Additionally, one could undertake detailed regulatory revision to provide the
FDA with the power to demand additional clinical trials when it deems necessary or to
preempt the costs of state liability through its review. Both are second best options that
will have lesser benefits in terms of information creation than a market-based solution.
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Because to a great extent the two courses for reform are mutually exclusive-many
aspects of regulatory revision will eliminate market-based incentives-a choice must
be made. Given the recent forward momentum of regulatory revisions, it is important
to act quickly and decisively if market-based options are to prevail.
A. Market-Based Optimization: Immunize Timely Disclosure
The idea of a market-based incentive is to encourage a firm to use its knowledge
and expertise in the medical product in question to determine what studies will be most
likely to provide important safety and efficacy information. The need to identify and
avoid future harm as early as possible provides the economic impetus; since some such
studies will not occur due to tort liability disincentives, a market-based approach seeks
to remove these barriers.
Reducing tort disincentives involves, first and foremost, absorbing the additional
marginal costs of transparency by limiting the viability of certain product liability
cases. In other words, a type of limited tort reform must be employed. Through this
mechanism, the costs of ex post practice-based tort liability are effectively transferred
back to those allegedly harmed. To be sure, it is a public policy choice-one that
places greater value on society's increased access to information over the benefits
plaintiffs and their attorneys derive from litigation uncertainty. The net societal gains in
terms of the ability to rationally assess medical treatments would seem to outweigh the
benefits of retaining the status quo.
Since some tort liability is important to induce a company to internalize the costs of
future harm by producing information, complete immunity is not a reasonable option;
one must be more circumscribed. Rather, a very narrow legal revision must be adopted
that specifically links the desired information with a liability limitation. The limitation
need not go beyond ensuring that a manufacturer that acts in a manner that benefits
society will not face liability as a result.
The notion of an information-linked tort liability limitation has been articulated
before. 17' Most prominently, the ALI's 1991 Study on Enterprise Responsibility for
Personal Injury suggests the adoption of a regulatory compliance defense that could
encompass information disclosure beyond that which is required by the FDA.
172
According to the study, this would address information shortfalls resulting from
"regulatory lag or other causes [that] leave risks unregulated; where regulation is
purely nominal; or where regulation is compromised [due to information
asymmetries]."173 However, the ALl report acknowledges that such immunity could be
overbroad, permitting a company to continue to market in the face of agency inaction,
with tort immunity. 174 Additionally, such a proposal would not preclude secrecy; a firm
is permitted to determine after the information is created whether the disadvantages of
171. See, e.g., Salbu, supra note 126, at 223-26 (discussing such a limitation in the context
of pharmaceutical advertising for off-label use); Stewart, supra note 10, at 2179-81 (advocating
the adoption of the ALl study's notion of tort preclusion in exchange for full regulatory
disclosure).
172. ALl REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 57, at 97.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 97 n.3 1. ("While courts might be uneasy with this result, they must not ignore the
institutional uneasiness that stems from allowing individual juries to second-guess a specialized
agency's reluctance to tighten its existing regulations.").
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disclosure outweigh the advantages of tort immunity (or to wait until the equation
favors disclosure and then obtain immunity).
A better model for addressing the disadvantages of blanket immunity is the familiar
tort concept that restricts evidence of subsequent remedial measures, embodied most
familiarly in Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 175 The rule states that
evidence of subsequent measures that, "if taken previously, would have made the
injury or harm less likely to occur," are not admissible to prove "negligence, culpable
conduct.... a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction.'
176
The purpose of the rule is to encourage remedial acts a defendant might not otherwise
undertake because such acts could increase liability by establishing that a problem
existed at the time of the plaintiff's injury.' 77 It has been applied to pharmaceutical
products liability cases that involve desirable remedies such as post-injury changes to
package inserts.178 In practice, the rule is less than perfect as an evidentiary barrier due
to the many exceptions that nevertheless permit remedial measures to be introduced.79
However, it can still serve an important purpose in focusing the trier of fact on the
specific use of the evidence rather than its tendency to indicate fault.180 Rule 407 and
the many analogous state rules are significant because they are prominent real life
embodiments of the aforementioned public policy decision to transfer the liability costs
of socially beneficial behavior back to plaintiffs.
Although structural similarities between an information production incentive and
existing subsequent remedial measure evidence rules are appropriate, the two must
necessarily be subtly different in the behavior they encourage. The object of a
production incentive is to induce action-the undertaking of voluntary studies-prior
to any knowledge of harm. Rule 407, on the other hand, addresses acts that take place
after the harm, when the appropriate remedial act is clear. To the extent that both relate
to future loss avoidance, the goals are otherwise the same. Most important to parallel is
the use of a limited evidentiary preclusion as a means for preserving the advantages of
tort liability.
Applying the notion of a limited exception to information incentives, the first step is
to articulate the particular type of information that requires encouragement. In the
context of medical treatments and devices, this is most certainly a controlled clinical
175. FED. R. EVID. 407. Most states have similar provisions. See Thomas M.-Fleming,
Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence ofRepairs, Change of Conditions, or Precautions Taken
After Accident-Modern State Cases, 15 A.L.R. 5th 119, 159 (1993) (noting that only one state
has abandoned the rule).
176. FED. R. EVID. 407.
177. See 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 127
(2d ed. 1994).
178. See BECK & VALE, supra note 71, § 11.01 [2] [a]-[b] (listing pharmaceutical cases using
the subsequent remedial measures rule in both state and federal jurisdictions).
179. The rule itself states that it "does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent
measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment." FED. R. EviD. 407. This can be a
fairly wide opening. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 177, § 127, at 26 (suggesting that
the rule invites courtroom games in an attempt to introduce the evidence).
180. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 177, § 127, at 26 ("[T]he principal impact of
FRE 407 is not so much in keeping evidence out altogether as it is in limiting the uses to which
the evidence may be put.").
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trial to investigate either efficacy or safety. More specifically, the important trials to
incentivize are those agreed-upon or voluntary studies that occur after FDA approval,
when the public is at most risk but the FDA has a weakened ability to persuade.
Secondly, the optimal timing of information creation and disclosure must be
considered. Early production and disclosure should be rewarded, while delayed acts
should receive no special treatment. Finally, one must address the particular liability
that creates the disincentive. As described above, liability is generally for a failure-to-
warn product defect case that is premised on the argument that a manufacturer failed in
its duty to communicate the problem before a given injury occurred.181
Putting it together, one could design a rule such that if a manufacturer follows a
specific, expeditious creation and disclosure path, it could count on avoiding a
particular type of tort liability. Generally, the liability limitation should be constrained
to studies conducted by the manufacturer as opposed to government or academic
researchers. This ensures that a manufacturer has a strong incentive to invest in
discovering the information first, as another's discovery of the same product defect will
not affect tort liability.
To cement the tort limitation into law and provide the necessary predictability, it
should be adopted as a statutory exception to a state's existing tort regime and/or as a
federal evidentiary law.1 82 Although appropriate wording is flexible, it is possible to
imagine a basic template. The exception should address a clinical study's role in
establishing a warning defect in later-filed cases:
(a) When a postmarketing study, conducted by or on behalf of a manufacturer
and initiated after [the date of this law's enactment], is fully disclosed
through registration and the reporting of all outcomes, it may not be used as
evidence in a design defect, a failure -to -warn defect, or a negligent failure-
to-warn case filed after the disclosure.
The exception should also separately address the fact that clinical studies are used to
retrospectively suggest knowledge of a defect:
(b) Additionally, said study shall provide a rebuttable presumption that a
manufacturer was not knowledgeable before the study's conclusion as to any
problem discovered as a result.
181. See supra notes 101-118 and accompanying text. The exact tort cause of action could
differ from state to state, depending on how it has been developed in a given jurisdiction. Some
jurisdictions could refer to this as a negligence case and some as strict liability, while states
within those groups could differ as to whether the failure to warn makes a product defective or
is, in and of itself, actionable. See BECK & VALE, supra note 71, § 2.02; PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
supra note 63, § 4.12. Semantics aside, the basic liability that must be circumscribed is
apparent.
182. Enacting an evidentiary limitation into federal law may have an effect on state product
liability cases via diversity jurisdiction. Generally, state law controls when it provides the
substantive rule of decision. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Some federal
jurisdictions view Rule 407 as subordinate to this doctrine and some find that the rules preempt
conflicting state law. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 177, § 133, at 70-71.
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To take advantage of this important evidentiary exclusion and presumption, a
manufacturer will be encouraged to address safety and efficacy issues as soon as
possible, certainly before a third party does. And as is appropriate for a market-based
incentive, the stronger the sales and wider the patent population, the more powerful the
incentive will be.
Of course, a tort liability limitation as stated above is not without drawbacks. While
the provisions are narrowly tailored to preserve most of the incentive in product
liability cases, they may end up restricting some cases with merit. This should be
acceptable as long as the overarching goal of greater information production is
satisfied. Additionally, one must recognize that other disincentives that accompany the
disclosure of negative information will not be avoided. For example, the economic loss
a company will suffer from pulling a high-profit product from the shelves 183 will still
act as a force against creation and disclosure. Also, one could argue that companies
will be likely to manipulate research in order to obtain the tort advantage (at least until
a disinterested third party uncovers the truth). 184 However, on balance, the greater
incentives lie with undertaking an investigation, and doing it early to gain tort
immunity, rather than focusing on strategies to generate short-term sales.
B. Second-Best Options: Regulatory Revisions
Given the existing power and expertise of major regulatory agencies such as the
FDA, it is reasonable to consider whether such government authority can be better
leveraged to address the likely information shortfall. At least two possible avenues for
regulatory revision are apparent. One would simply tie a manufacturer's obligation in
tort to the requirements for regulatory approval; satisfying the regulators would
preempt additional state tort law. Another would be to increase the FDA's ability to
demand information, particularly post-approval. Both would probably be effective in
increasing the amount of information produced, but are likely to be less efficient and
effective than a market-based approach for a variety of reasons.
1. FDA Preemption and the Decrease in the Marginal Benefits of Production
Whether complying with FDA regulations should satisfy state common law tort
duties,' 85 or indeed, should preempt them, has long been a popular topic among legal
commentators. 186 Clearly, manufacturers face stringent FDA production and disclosure
requirements on the road to approval and thereafter. In many cases, manufacturers may
also be limited in undertaking certain acts by regulatory law, such as disseminating
183. See supra note 82.
184. Former medical journal editor Marcia Angell suggests that the danger of allowing
medical product companies to control clinical trial research is so great that the system should be
completely revamped to provide for strong federal oversight and administration. See ANGELL,
supra note 51, at 244-45.
185. Note that noncompliance with FDA regulations could be the basis of a negligence per
se action. PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 63, § 4.22 at 194; see also David G. Owen, Proving
Negligence in Modern Products Liability Litigation, 36 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1003, 1008-09 (2004)
(describing the requirements for a negligence per se case generally and noting that a violation of
a statute or regulation must be proven).
186. See supra note 10.
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certain information to the public without FDA review and approval. 187 This tight
control over the information environment may be appropriate for a primarily or
exclusively federal legal landscape.
In theory, Congress could have carved out an explicit preemption scheme for the
regulatory regime articulated by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 188 and the
Medical Device Amendments Act (MDA).189 However, in the context of the MDA, the
Supreme Court has ruled that congressional intent does not suggest the elimination of
all state product liability law as a remedy for manufacturer disclosure issues.
190
Additionally, several courts and commentators have recognized the lack of any explicit
preemption in the FDCA as applied to prescription drugs. 191 To the extent there is a
case for preemption, it appears that implied conflict preemption 92 is the essential
187. For example, sample labels must be included with the drug applications. 21 U.S.C. §
355(b)(1 )(F) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 21 C.F.R. § 314.120 (2004). Additionally, all safety and
effectiveness claims made in prescription drug promotion must be based on substantial evidence
or substantial clinical experience, and cannot be false or misleading. 21 U.S.C. § 352(q) (2000
& Supp. IV 2004); § 355(d)-(e); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e) (2004).
188. § 355(d)(5).
189. 21 U.S.C. § 360(b) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). There is, in fact, limited statutory
preemption for FDA regulations in the context of nonprescription drugs. See 21 U.S.C. § 379r
(2000) (No state may establish requirements that are "different from or in addition to, or that
[are] otherwise not identical with, a requirement under this chapter, the Poison Prevention
Packaging Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 1471 et seq.), or the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act....").
An even more limited provision exists for medical devices. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2000) (No
state may establish requirements that are "different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the device. ... ). Additionally, in 2005 the House of
Representatives passed a bill that would grant immunity for punitive damages related to safety,
labeling, or packaging for companies that comply with FDA standards. Help Efficient,
Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2005, H.R. 5, 109th Cong. § 7(c)
(2005). The bill did not emerge from the Senate and has not been reintroduced in the 110th
Congress.
190. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,491 (1996) ("[Section] 360(k) [of the MDA]
simply was not intended to pre-empt most, let alone all, general common-law duties enforced by
damages actions.").
191. See, e.g., Motus v. Pfizer Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2000) ("[M]ost
courts have found that FDA regulations as to design and warning standards are minimum
standards which do not preempt state law defective design and failure to warn claims.") (citing,
among others, Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 1989); Mazur v. Merck & Co.,
742 F. Supp. 239,247 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Kociemba v. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1299 (D.
Minn. 1988)), aff'don other grounds, 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004); James T. O'Reilly, A State
of Extinction: Does Food and Drug Administration Approval of a Prescription Drug Label
Extinguish State Claims for Inadequate Warning? 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 287, 289-90 (2003)
(noting the lack of preemption for prescription drugs). The lack of a preemption clause may be
due to the fact that the FDCA was adopted before state tort law became such a powerful force.
See David R. Geiger & Mark D. Rosen, Rationalizing Product Liabilityfor Prescription Drugs:
Implied Preemption, Federal Common Law, and Other Paths to Uniform Pharmaceutical Safety
Standards, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 395, 397 (1996).
192. Many types of preemption are theoretically possible in the context of a regulatory
compliance defense. See generally Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO.
L.J. 2085 (2000) (reviewing traditional and suggesting novel categories of preemption,
including explicit, conflict, and field). But the fact that federal FDA law is generally presumed
2007]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
question, which must be determined on a case-by-case basis.193 The Supreme Court has
stated that the decision to preempt has been delegated in part by Congress to the FDA,
to be accomplished through regulation.194 Although the FDA has traditionally been
reticent to issue rules that explicitly preempt state law, 195 it has recently made some
very strong moves in this direction.
The first steps taken by the FDA in asserting a more strict preemption doctrine
involved the increasing use of amicus briefing in medical product liability cases.' 96 By
far the most significant push for preemption is manifested in the FDA's 2006 drug
labeling rules. 197 The new rules are mundane in most respects, the product of typical
notice and comment rulemaking. However, in response to comments received related
to preemption, the FDA included some rather extreme language that purports to
articulate the agency's official position: "[The] FDA believes that under existing
preemption principles, FDA approval of labeling under the act, whether it be in the old
or new format, preempts conflicting or contrary State law."' 98 The statement caught
many observers off guard, as the preamble to the originally proposed rule specifically
stated that it was not intended to preempt existing state law. 199 In a subsequent lengthy
to coexist with state tort law leads to the conclusion that conflict preemption is the only
important form.
193. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347-48 (2001) (finding
implied preemption for a state tort action based on fraud on the FDA, as the entire interaction
occurred only because of FDA law); Hurley v. Lederle Labs. Div. of Am. Cyanamid, 863 F.2d
1173, 1179 (5th Cir. 1988) (suggesting, in dicta, that preemption could occur in failure to warn
cases based on labeling). Given the similarities of standards and level of review, there does not
appear to be any reason to treat drugs and biologics differently from medical devices in terms of
preemption analysis. See, e.g., Green & Schultz, supra note 10, at 2123-24.
194. Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 496 ("Because the FDA is the federal agency to which
Congress has delegated its authority to implement the provisions of the [Medical Device
Amendments statute], the agency is uniquely qualified to determine whether a particular form of
state law [is an obstacle and] therefore, whether it should be pre-empted.") (citation omitted).
195. See Noah, supra note 10, at 2158 (describing the FDA's lack of opposition to judicial
second-guessing as "difficult to fathom").
196. See, e.g., Hom v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 177 (2004) ("The FDA conceives of
Horn's state common law claims as imposing a 'requirement' which is 'different' from that
imposed by the FDA in the PMA process, and thus requiring preemption."); Amicus Brief for
the U.S. in Support of the Defendant-Appellee & Cross-Appellant, & in Favor of Reversal of the
Dist. Court's Order Denying Partial Summary Judgment to Defendant-Appellee & Cross-
Appellant, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498), 2002
WL 32303084; Amicus Curiae Brief of the U.S. in Support of Defendants/Respondents
Smithkline Beecham Consumer Healthcare LP, et al., Dowhal v. Smithkline Beecham Consumer
Healthcare, LP, 88 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2004) (No. S109306), 2003 WL 23527781; Plaintiff, Device
Maker Differ on Significance of Government's New Stand on Preemption, 32 Product Safety &
Liability Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 567 (June 21, 2004) (noting that the FDA interpreted device
preemption more expansively in a brief submitted in a federal appeals court case); Gary Young,
FDA Strategy Would Pre-Empt Tort Suits, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 1, 2004, at 1.
197. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts.
201, 314, and 601).
198. Id.
199. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs
and Biologics, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,081, 81,103 (proposed Dec. 22, 2000) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 201) ("Accordingly, FDA has determined that this proposed rule does not contain
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discussion that responded to comments made about the proposed rule, the FDA argued
against the notion that labeling requirements are a safety "floor" over which state tort
law may build a higher duty of care. 20 0 According to the agency, the rules are intended
to be comprehensive. 20 1 Because the FDA controls so completely the labeling
requirements, it argues that state tort law decisions that require any different or
additional warnings are in dangerous conflict.20 2 At this point, it is unclear what effect
the new labeling rule would have on the viability of failure-to-warn tort cases20 3 or
even whether it will endure.
20 4
policies that have federalism implications or that preempt State law."). A particularly vociferous
objection was raised by the National Conference of State Legislatures over this policy change.
See Letter from Sen. Steven J. Rauschenberger, President, National Conference of State
Legislatures, to Hon. Mike Leavitt, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs. (Jan. 13,
2006), available at http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/FDArule.htm.
200. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934-35.
201. Id. at 3935.
202. The FDA's strongly worded position appears to argue against the basic utility of state
tort law in addressing pharmaceutical information disclosure:
Given the comprehensiveness of FDA regulation of drug safety, effectiveness, and
labeling under the act, additional requirements for the disclosure of risk
information are not necessarily more protective of patients. Instead, they can erode
and disrupt the careful and truthful representation of benefits and risks that
prescribers need to make appropriate judgments about drug use.
Id.
203. Recent district court rulings on preemption that consider the FDA's comments have
been decidedly mixed. At least three courts have found that the language in the preamble
preempts state tort law in the context of a pharmaceutical failure-to-warn case. Ackerman v.
Wyeth Pharm., No. 4:05CV84, 2006 WL 2591078, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 8,2006), withdrawn,
2006 WL 3780913 (Dec. 20, 2006); In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod.
Liab. Litig., No. M:05-1699 CRB, 2006 WL 2374742, at *9-*10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006);
Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc, 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 537-38 (E.D. Pa. 2006). On the other hand, at
least five other courts have found under similar circumstances that it does not. Perry v. Novartis
Pharma. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678, 683-84 (E.D. Pa. 2006); McNellis v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ.
05-1286, 2006 WL 2819046, at *8-* 10 (D. N.J. Sep. 29, 2006); Alaska v. Eli Lilly & Co., No.
3:06-CV-88 TMB, 2006 WL 2168831, at *3-*4 (D. Alaska July 28, 2006) (federal jurisdiction
only); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Lit., Nos. 4:03CVI507-WRW, 4:05CV00497, 2006 WL
380639 1, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 27, 2006); Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964, 968 (D.
Neb. 2006). The Second Circuit considered the preemptive effect of the FDA's new position in
dicta and indicated that it seriously questioned the agency's power to make such a
determination. Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 97 n.9 (2d Cir. 2006).
204. The FDA itself concedes at the conclusion of the comments that "FDA's regulation of
drug labeling will not preempt all State law actions." Requirements on Content and Format of
Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3936. Courts
will be left to determine whether any company in compliance with FDA rules can fail with
respect to disclosing information to the public. For example, a regulatory defense to a failure-to-
wam claim may be thwarted if the use of the medical product is a foreseeable one that is outside
the scope of FDA approval. This is particularly important in the context of drugs, wherein "off-
label" uses are an extremely common U.S. medical practice. See James O'Reilly & Amy Dalal,
Off-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and Marketer Liabilityfor Unapproved Uses of FDA-
Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 295, 298 (2003) (noting the prevalence of off-label
prescriptions and quoting an AMA study that found forty to sixty percent of U.S. drug
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Even if the FDA's position on preemption were to be reversed or toned down, it is
possible to achieve the same effect through action by the States. In the context of
product liability cases, state courts may (and do) defer in differing degrees to FDA
requirements when assessing a manufacturer's compliance with tort law obligations.
For example, a court may consider disclosures to the FDA as evidence of due care in
satisfying the duty to warn.2 °5 In many instances regulatory compliance may be
sufficient, but the facts of the individual case must be assessed on the merits. 20 6 A few
states possess a common law or statutory presumption that compliance with FDA rules
demonstrates that a warning is sufficient 20 7 or at least limits damages. 20 8 Often, the
presumption may be rebutted by evidence that either the regulations or agency review
was insufficient to provide safety.20 9 This approach has been part of the growing tort
reform movement 1 ° and was largely embraced by the Restatement (Third) on Torts.2 1'
prescriptions are for offiabel uses); James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use,
and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD DRUG L.J. 71, 80
(1998). And Congress could, of course, resolve any ambiguity by rewriting the applicable
statutes to explicitly reject or adopt and delineate the FDA's preemption doctrine. See, e.g.,
Schism v. United States, 316 F.3d 1259, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Congress may ratify agency
conduct 'giv[ing] the force of law to official action unauthorized when taken."') (citing Swayne
& Hoyt v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 302 (1937)). For a period of time, it could even reject
the rule under the provisions of the Congressional Review Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2000).
205. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 63, § 4.22, at 193-94.
206. Id.; BECK& VALE, supra note 71 § 2.04[2].
207. California is one example of a state with at least some semblance of a common law
defense based on the adequacy of administrative review. See Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d
167, 172 (Cal. 1993). Several states apply a statutory presumption of adequacy based on FDA
approval, specifically. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2946(5) (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:58C-4 (West 2000); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.007(a) (Vernon 2003). A few
states apply a presumption to products in compliance with government codes, regulations, etc.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-105(a) (1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403 (1991); IND. CODE
§ 34-20-5-1 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-09 (2003);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(B)(4) (Anderson 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104
(2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.050(1) (West
1992).
208. At least five states apply a statutory limitation on punitive damages. ARtz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-701 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302.5(5) (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.80(C) (LexisNexis 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2
(2005).
209. See David G. Owen, Special Defenses in Modern Product Liability Law, 70 Mo. L.
REV. 1, 21 (2005) (citing examples of product liability cases won because the plaintiff was able
to show FDA review to be inadequate).
210. Perhaps the strongest limitation on state tort law is Michigan's statute on product
liability reform, enacted in 1995, see 1995 Mich. Pub. Acts 249, relevant section codified at
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2946 (2000)), and upheld as constitutional by the Michigan Supreme
Court in 2003. Taylor v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 658 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Mich. 2003)
(finding that MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2946(5) was not an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the FDA). The relevant section applies to drugs, specifically, and states, in
part,
In a product liability action against a manufacturer or seller, a product that is a
drug is not defective or unreasonably dangerous, and the manufacturer or seller is
not liable, if the drug was approved for safety and efficacy by the United States
food and drug administration, and the drug and its labeling were in compliance
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Whether preemption of state tort law is achieved directly at the federal level or
through state-specific tort reform, one might think that the elimination of liability
would fully address the practice-based information disincentives described above.
Without the burden of speculative mass torts, a manufacturer would be free to engage
in full prospective loss avoidance. But such strong measures may be less than optimal,
significantly underperforming compared to market-based incentives. The natural
limitations of a large bureaucracy are to blame.
For FDA approval, due process and basic administrative procedure dictate the use
of general rules and guidelines.212 Through the mandated formality of industry-agency
interactions, a bureaucratic disconnect can form which may not incorporate all of the
relevant knowledge possessed by a firm.21 3 Such a structure is inherently less flexible
than a company using proprietary information and its own best judgment as to when an
investment in greater knowledge is appropriate. As a result, some products may be
suboptimally regulated.21 4 A rational company will meet only the minimum
requirements necessary for the FDA seal of approval. Additionally, an agency
composed of a small and somewhat uniform set of actors would be expected to be less
efficient in conducting essential information tasks than an agency-industry
collaborative effort that utilizes the diverse research elements of private companies. 215
In fact, a prominent review of FDA culture and authority issued by the National
Academies' Institute of Medicine in 2006 found that the agency suffers from
"organizational dysfunction" that "may directly or indirectly affect [its] handling of
drug safety concerns. 2 16 Requesting the right information, analyzing it correctly, and
determining how best to disseminate it to the public are critical to information flow,
with the United States food and drug administration's approval at the time the
drug left the control of the manufacturer or seller.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2946(5) (1995).
211. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 6(d)(2) cmt. e ("When the
content of the warnings is mandated or approved by a governmental agency regulation and a
court finds that compliance with such regulation federally preempts tort liability, then no
liability under this Section can attach.").
212. For example, FDA employees in the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research use a
standard Manual of Policies and Procedures (MaPP) to guide appropriate agency-industry
interactions. See FDA, CDER MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (MAPP),
http://www.fda.gov/cder/mapp.htm (last visited Oct. 30,2006); see also Jon D. Hanson & Kyle
D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-BasedRegulation,
107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1339 n.724 (1998) (describing, in the context of the tobacco litigations, the
problems of "command-and-control regulation" by the FDA and noting that it is constrained by
the Administrative Procedures Act).
213. See Ernst R. Bemdt, Adrian H.B. Gottschalk & Matthew W. Strobeck, Opportunities
for Improving the Drug Development Process: Results from a Survey of Industry and the FDA
22-26 (NBER Working Paper No. 11425, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
wl 1425 (referring to survey results of FDA personnel and individuals at companies regulated by
the FDA demonstrating that communications between the two are not always good, and more
communications would be perceived as valuable by both sides).
214. It has been suggested that suboptimal regulation exists as a general matter with respect
to medical devices as compared to drugs. Green & Schultz, supra note 10, at 2145.
215. ALl REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 57, at 97 (acknowledging that agency regulation
can fail in instances wherein "the agency does not have material information about risk and its
assessment or control, but regulated firms do").
216. IoM REPORT, supra note 40, at 79-90.
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and private actors should be provided with the incentives to contribute. Finally, blanket
tort immunity or preemption may encourage gaming of the regulatory process.2 1 7 The
FDA is often accused of acting in an overly industry-friendly manner, 1 s and given the
powerful incentives of tort immunity for regulatory compliance, the benefits in exerting
undue influence on the agency only increase.
Where the regulatory process falls short, state tort law could provide a useful
supplement. But in a preemption world, the regulatory schema becomes both the
baseline and the ceiling for firm behavior. A firm derives no benefit from acting
beyond the regulatory rules because it will face no liability costs. And if the regulatory
rules operate at any point below that to which a cost-internalizing company might
otherwise aspire, the marginal benefits of information production will be reduced as
compared to the market-based ideal (see figure 3, curve MBp).
MC
U
MB
QlP QI Quantity of Information
Figure 3. Impact of FDA Preemption. FDA preemption permits a company to avoid some liability for future
harm through FDA compliance. Thus, the marginal benefits curve MBp reflects the decreased benefits for
uncovering defects due to this incomplete internalization as compared to MB. The reduction in benefits can be
expected to reduce the quantity of information to QIp.
Information production may be significantly better under a preemption/immunity
scheme than a bare transparency scheme-particularly if FDA requirements are
reasonably close to the cost-internalizing idea. That makes preemption a second best
solution, and perhaps one that is a useful placeholder until a market-based approach
can be implemented.
217. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 10, at 2076-79; Thomas 0. McGarity, Beyond Buckman:
Wrongful Manipulation of the Regulatory Process in the Law of Torts, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 549,
558-70 (2002) (describing, in the context of medical devices, strategies to mislead the FDA and
suggesting that the agency is unable to respond).
218. See IoM REPORT, supra note 40, at 70,74-75 (describing various investigations into the
question of undue industry influence on FDA decision making); Steenburg, supra note 33, at
338 (suggesting that pharmaceutical companies have, in the past, used political and social
pressure to encourage the FDA to make concessions on approval and postapproval
requirements).
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2. Increased FDA Power to Compel Information in View
of the Disadvantages of Central Control
Employing a regulatory option to address clinical study production disincentives
seems straightforward. Nominally, it involves nothing more than increasing the FDA's
authority to require postmarketing studies. This would effectively eliminate much of
the need for companies to voluntarily fill in the information gaps. Since this power
already exists in a limited context,219 this appears to be simply a matter of broadening
the statute. Bills have actually been introduced in the 110th Congress to do just that,
either directly220 or through the establishment of a "Center for Postmarket Drug
Evaluation and Research.",221 However, the regulatory empowerment fix is likely to be
more problematic than this suggests. Ultimately, the details of empowering the FDA in
this manner may make this regulatory option less attractive.
The primary problem is the FDA's general inexperience with identifying and
structuring appropriate postmarket clinical trials.222 Existing FDA authority to require
such trials is limited to two instances in which clearly identified categories of clinical
trials, normally conducted preapproval, are deferred for postmarketing testing: (1)
when a drug is approved under accelerated approval conditions,223 and (2) when drugs
are planned for use in pediatric populations but the studies of some subpopulations are
deferred.224 However, in those cases, the FDA is not actually responding to a problem
or encouraging a general program of long-term testing. For studies conducted in
connection with accelerated approval, the FDA is doing little more than moving the
approval date forward to get the drug on the market sooner; the usual number of
traditional clinical studies are still conducted in approximately the same amount of
time.225 Deferred pediatric studies permit a manufacturer to obtain an approval for
219. See 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.55,314.510, 601.27,
601.41 (2004).
220. The SAFE Drug Act gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services the power to
order manufacturers of approved drugs to conduct postmarketing studies "after receiving
evidence of a significant issue regarding the safety or lack of effectiveness of an approved drug."
H.R. 1165, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007).
221. The Food and Drug Administration Safety Act of 2007 gives the director of a proposed
Center for Postmarket Drug Evaluation and Research-an internal FDA entity that would
continually assess risk for approved drugs-the power to require postmarketing studies. S. 486,
110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (detailing a proposed § 507(e) revision to the FDCA). A substantially
similar bill was introduced in the House of Representatives. See Food and Drug Administration
Safety Act of 2007, H.R. 788, 110th Cong. The Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act of
2007, S. 484, 110th Cong. § 101, takes a slightly different approach by incorporating the power
to require postmarketing studies into a "risk evaluation and mitigation strategy" tailored to
particular drugs.
222. Currently, oversight of postmarketing commitments is not a top priority at FDA. See
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., MONITORING OF
POSTMARKETING STUDY COMMITMENTS 17-18 (2006) [hereinafter OIG REPORT].
223. 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.510, 601.41 (2004).
224. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.55, 601.27 (2004).
225. 21 C.F.R. § 314.510. But see STAFF REPORT, CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE: How THE FDA
ALLOWS DRUG COMPANIES TO ABUSE THE ACCELERATED APPROvAL PROCESS (June 1, 2005)
[hereinafter CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE], available at http://markey.house.gov/docs/health/
iss-health-rep050601 .pdf (suggesting that many of these studies are not, in fact, completed).
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general application while continuing to work to establish safety and efficacy in
children.226 Again, such studies are not a higher-level inquiry into a medical treatment
that has been red flagged, but rather a standard undertaking to gather evidence for a
specialized group spread out over a different timeline.
A better analogy to the kind of analysis the FDA would be conducting with the
expanded clinical trial authority is that which is undertaken for determining when
"agreed upon" studies are appropriate.227 In such cases, the FDA or a company
believes there may be a possible safety or efficacy issue, but not one great enough to
delay approval, and they agree on a study that will provide additional information.
228
However, one would expect that the atmosphere is a bit more conciliatory during
preapproval negotiations than after a drug has been on the market, generating
potentially billions of dollars in sales each year. 229 Postapproval, companies clearly
have much more incentive to oppose the FDA. In the face of firm opposition, giving
the FDA the legal authority to undertake an action may stop somewhat short of real-
world power.
The FDA's power to punish firm behavior, even in the face of a possible safety
issue, is somewhat limited. Actually removing a drug, biologic, or medical device from
the market is especially difficult.230 First, as a doctrine of enforcement, an FDA
initiated "recall" of an approved treatment or device is extremely rare. 23' The agency
almost always prefers to encourage the manufacturer to voluntarily remove the medical
product from the market.232 In fact, the FDA has no authority to order a mandatory
Accelerated approval may result in an additional number of total studies, when those conducted
using a surrogate endpoint are added to the required postmarketing studies.
226. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.55, 601.27 (2004).
227. See 21 U.S.C. § 356b (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2)(vii) (2004).
228. See FDAMA 130 GUIDANCE, supra note 37, at 3.
229. See CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE, supra note 225, at 24.
From a financial perspective, post-marketing confirmatory studies are very
expensive and the completion of the study does nothing to increase profits....
Under the current system there are few benefits and numerous risks associated
with conducting post-marketing studies, so it is to companies' advantage to delay
their completion indefinitely.
Id.
230. See IoM REPORT, supra note 40, at 157 & n.1 ("After approval... FDA's regulatory
and enforcement options generally lie at the ends of the spectrum of regulatory actions: do
nothing or precipitate the voluntary withdrawal of the drug.").
231. See 21 C.F.R. § 7.40 (2004) (describing voluntary and FDA initiated recall requests,
and stating that "[a] request by the Food and Drug Administration that a firm recall a product is
reserved for urgent situations").
232. See id. (stating that, in the context of drugs and biologics, "[r]ecall is generally more
appropriate and affords better protection for consumers than seizure, when many lots ofproduct
have been widely distributed"). Media reports often inaccurately suggest that the FDA forces
manufacturers to involuntarily recall marketed treatments when a safety issue arises. In fact, in
almost every case, the manufacturer actually agrees to withdraw the product. For example, a
recent New York Times article carried the headline "F.D.A. Orders Recall of Intravenous
Pumps" and referred to the recall of 206,000 Baxter International pumps that deliver medicines
intravenously to patients. Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Orders Recall of Intravenous Pumps, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2005, at A12. However, the FDA press release on the recall states that Baxter
initiated the recall and that it had "voluntarily stopped shipping" the product. Press Release,
FDA, FDA Announces Class I Recall of Baxter Healthcare's Colleague Volumetric Infusion
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recall of drugs and biologics-only medical devices.233 Second, if the FDA does
decide to revoke the marketing approval of a drug or device on its statutory authority,
the execution is no simple flipping of a switch.234 Such a proceeding is nominally an
administrative procedure, and as an agency subject to the Administrative Procedure
231Act (APA), the FDA must provide opportunities for manufacturer responses and
possibly even hearings.236 The arduous nature of such an act renders much less potent
its power to induce an unwilling manufacturer to produce information.2 37 This inability
to employ a big regulatory stick apparently extends to situations in which FDA rules
are actually violated. For example, the FDA reports that forty-seven percent of NDA
holders with postmarketing commitments and half of BLA holders did not comply with
the annual reporting requirements in 2005.238 Additionally, an independent analysis,
conducted by Representative Edward Markey, of industry compliance with
Pumps (July 21, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2005/
NEW01209.html.
233. If a manufacturer refuses to cooperate with an FDA-requested drug or biologic recall,
the FDA's only recourse is technically referred to as seizure, not recall. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §
332 (2000) (seizure of products under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act for misbranding or
adulteration); 21 C.F.R. § 7.40(c) (2004) ("Seizure, multiple seizure, or other court action is
indicated when a firm refuses to undertake a recall requested by the Food and Drug
Administration, or where the agency has reason to believe that a recall would not be effective,
determines that a recall is ineffective, or discovers that a violation is continuing."). However, the
FDA has clear authority to order a mandatory recall of medical devices. 21 U.S.C. § 360(h)(e)
(2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 21 C.F.R. § 810.10 (2004).
234. See IOM REPORT, supra note 40, at 168-69 ("[Any grant of FDA authority] must be
accompanied by administrative procedures that protect the due process rights of affected
parties.").
235. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706
(2000)).
236. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(e), 360e(e) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 21 C.F.R. §§ 16.1, 810.11
(2004).
237. See Steenburg, supra note 33, at 337-38 (referring to the "toothless threat of
withdrawal" as an obstacle to enforcing compliance with phase IV clinical trial agreements). Of
course, most companies would be much better off complying with FDA requests rather than
opposing them, given the potential liability that could follow from marketing a product deemed
unsafe by the agency. Some suggest that this provides FDA with a great deal of power compared
to other agencies. See, e.g., Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of
Congressional Delegations ofAuthority, 1997 Wis. L. Rv. 873, 892-93 (1997). While this may
be true, it is still less power than most believe the FDA possesses, and perhaps not enough to
effectively police violations of FDA rules. See William W. Vodra & Arthur N. Levine, Anchors
Away: The Food and Drug Administration's Use ofDisgorgement Abandons Legal Moorings,
59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 3-4 (2004) (describing the FDA's limited remedies for manufacturers'
violations of rules, consent decrees, and injunctions when product withdrawal is off the table).
238. The FDA indicated that forty-seven percent ofpostmarketing commitments attached to
approved NDAs or abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) and fifty percent of
postmarketing commitments attached to BLAs had no annual report submitted within sixty days
of their anniversary dates. See Report on the Performance of Drug and Biologics Firms in
Conducting Postmarketing Commitment Studies, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,978, 10,978-79 (Mar. 3,
2006); see also Steenburg, supra note 33, at 362-69 (describing phase IV noncompliance data
and the lack of available enforcement tools). According to the HHS Inspector General's Office,
the FDA does not have the ability to track postmarketing study timeliness or progress toward
completion. OIG REPORT, supra note 222, at 11.
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postmarketing commitments raised similar concerns. 2 39 For the accelerated approval
program, specifically, it found that half the outstanding studies had not even been
started (even though the drug was marketed), and forty-six percent of the commitments
made since 1992 are not complete. 240 Despite these incidents of noncompliance, no
drug has disappeared from the market as a consequence.
There may be additional political issues that hamper this solution. In the eyes of the
public, an FDA order to conduct further clinical studies on a currently marketed
product could appear to be a tacit admission that the product is not safe.241 Given the
recent attacks on the FDA's ability to safeguard the nation's drug and device markets,
the agency may be loath to encourage the suggestion that it failed in its job to fully
review the product in question before approval.242 Additionally, there may be internal
pressure within the FDA against imposing greater scrutiny. A 2002 survey of almost
four hundred FDA scientists found that almost one-fifth claimed to have been
pressured to recommend approval of a new drug despite the existence of safety,
efficacy, or quality questions.243 Additionally, the IoMReport noted that the agency's
heavy reliance on user-fees for funding exacerbates the concern regarding industry
influence. 244 As a result of FDA culture, far fewer studies may be ordered than would
be optimal in view of the evidence, making this option less effective overall than a
market-based incentive.
CONCLUSION
While the recent attempts to improve transparency in the medical products industry
have a laudable goal, they risk creating a more dangerous environment than currently
exists. Greater disclosure of industry-sponsored testing could lead to a reasonable, if
disappointing, decision to minimize tort and consumer protection risks by generating
less information. As a result, important information flowing from voluntary clinical
trials could dry up under this new regime. Revelations like those that impacted the
safety-efficacy profiles of drugs such as Vioxx might never occur.
To unravel the paradox of greater future disclosure resulting in less information, the
source of the disincentive must be explicitly addressed. The rules must be rearranged
to produce a creation incentive as well as a disclosure incentive. Due to the advantages
of full firm participation in information creation, the optimal structure is a market-
239. CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE, supra note 225, at 10-11.
240. Id. at 10-11.
241. In the same vein, an approval conditioned on further study could be an
acknowledgement that the application did not contain adequate tests to demonstrate safety under
the conditions described on the label. Steenburg, supra note 33, at 359-60. The FDA is careful,
semantically, to avoid this perception. Id.
242. See Elizabeth C. Price, Teaching the Elephant to Dance: Privatizing the FDA Review
Process, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 651, 654-59 (1996) (describing the FDA's culture of risk
aversion). However, one could also argue that the same tendency toward risk aversion would
induce the FDA to request more tests. Id.
243. See Marc Kaufman, Many FDA Scientists Had Drug Concerns, 2002 Survey Shows,
WASH. POST, Dec. 16,2004, at Al (quoting an HHS survey in which 63 of 360 respondents said
"they had been pressured to recommend approval of a new drug despite reservations about its
safety, effectiveness or quality").
244. IoM REPORT, supra note 40, at 73.
[Vol. 82:623
2007] MEDICAL PRODUCTINFORMATION INCENTIVES 671
based incentive that attenuates tort exposure from product liability litigation in
response to positive information disclosures through an evidentiary limitation.
However, a structure that utilizes blanket preemption in exchange for regulatory
compliance or simply increases the authority of the FDA to require clinical trials will at
least partially resolve the transparency paradox. As such, regulatory revision proposals
should be considered second-best solutions to the information production problem.
Through the proper balance of information creation and disclosure incentives, the
highly positive contributions of medical products to health care in the United States
and throughout the world can be maintained, and hopefully improved.

